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Abstract
The focus of information security has shifted from being “technology­oriented” to being 
“management­oriented” during the past decade since most identified information security 
breaches occur because of human errors. It is also observed that most information security 
attacks occur from the inside or with the involvement of an insider. Even though effective 
information security uses physical, technical, and operational controls, where operational 
controls concern the conduct of employees with regard to information security, the adherence 
of employees of an organization to its policies is automatically assumed instead of ensured. 
Thus, despite the overall understanding that the human factor should be taken into 
consideration in information security management (ISM), most security solutions available 
today still rely on purely technical measures to enforce information security. Yet, people may 
easily bypass technological controls and restrictions by revealing their authentication
information to others.  
This research addresses the problem of improper sharing of information by authorized 
insiders with outsiders or unauthorized insiders, and proposes a managerial solution, which 
employs a mix of technological and social methods and techniques to achieve internal control 
of information and communication within an organization. As human behaviour can be 
categorized, this research proposes the concept of behavioural profiling, a method similar to 
criminal profiling, in order to predict behavioural patterns of employees. The levels of 
observance of secure practices by the organization’s employees are monitored through the 
automatic detection of their cyber activity by the security system and personal observance of 
their non-cyber activity by their managers and the security personnel. Human resource 
managers conduct background checks on employees to obtain their background information, 
and all this information is combined together in order to create employee security behavioural 
profiles by categorizing behavioural patterns, and thus help in identifying employees whose 
actions could potentially lead to ISM problems and information security infractions. The 
solution further entails determining and scheduling the level and type of security education 
and training to be given to each user. By employing socio-technological information 
gathering techniques and methods to provide a managerial solution to this human-related 
problem of information security, the concept proposed through this research overcomes the 
viii 
weaknesses of a purely technological solution. 
The system implemented to prove the feasibility of the proposed concept computes cyber 
activity of users, allows non-cyber activity and background information to be inputted to the 
system by managers and security personnel, and by human resource managers, respectively, 
then compiles security behavioural profiles and determines the level of security education and 
training required by each of the employees, and presents the behavioural profiles and security 
education and training schedules in summarized, detailed and graphical forms. It also allows 
the information security officer to view behaviour concerning cyber activity, non-cyber 
activity, and background information, separately and thereby recognize if the managers and 
security personnel who personally observe the employees’ non­cyber activity display any 
personal bias towards the employees, and thus use his or her own personal judgement. 
Further by allowing the information security officer to configure the security behavioural 
rules to be aligned with the business objectives of the organization, this system can be tailor-
made to suit the specific requirements of the organization.  
The results of the testing of this implemented system show that the system can compute 
users’ cyber activity as expected and that the developed profiles can effectively predict 
security behavioural flaws leading to information security infractions. The results of the 
usability evaluation performed on this system implementation prove that the system provides 
suggestions concerning employees’ security behaviour in a convenient and user-friendly 
fashion to enable faster decision-making by information security officers and security 
managers. 
Keywords: information security, insider threat, human behaviour, profiling, personality type, 
social, technological 
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Overview
1.1 Introduction 
The concept of information security began with its focus revolving around technological 
aspects (Bishop, 2003), (Harris, 2004), such as cryptography, secure networking protocols, 
ethical hacking, digital forensics, etc. With the realization that security was a process rather 
than an end result, came the addition of secure software development. The human aspect 
pertaining to information security was recognized during the past couple of decades (Asai, 
2007) with international standards such as ISO/IEC 270001 (2005) and the COSO framework 
(1994) emphasizing the importance of taking human resource security into consideration 
when managing information security. Thus, the role of information security has now become 
more management-oriented than technology-oriented, and this change is defined by Lacey 
(2009) as “The shifting focus of information security” (Lacey, 2009).   
Vroom and von Solms (2003) explain that physical, technical and operational controls are 
used to carry out effective information security, where the operational controls are those that 
concern the behaviour and actions of the employee with regard to information security. As 
the conduct of the employee within the organization plays an increasingly vital role in 
securing information, operational controls are considered extremely important.  They state 
that: “In order to regulate this behaviour and conform to the objectives of the company, the 
employees of the organization need strict and proper guidelines. These guidelines are set out 
in the information security policies of the organization, detailing the procedures, rules and 
regulations that need to be followed by the employees in order to preserve the integrity and 
confidentiality of company information.” (Vroom & von Solms, 2003). Yet, they argue that 
even though information systems security auditing has been introduced to ensure that these 
policies, procedures and regulations are effective, auditing is not performed on the employees 
who actually follow the operational controls that are prescribed. Instead, “it is simply 
assumed that the employee will adhere to these audited policies” (Vroom & von Solms, 
32003). Thus, it can be seen that despite the overall understanding that the human factor 
should be taken into consideration in information security management (ISM), most security 
solutions available today still rely on purely technical measures to enforce information 
security. Yet, people may easily bypass technological controls and restrictions such as access 
control by revealing their authentication information to others.  
In order to succeed in business, it is mandatory to ensure that access to information is strictly 
limited to the personnel who need to know it in order to perform their assigned tasks 
(Schweitzer, 1996).  Yet, as Bean (2008) states, most identified information security breaches 
occur because of human errors, resulting from the lack of proper knowledge and training, 
ignorance, and failure to follow procedures. Some of the most common information security 
problems of today include unintentional sharing of confidential information (Asai & 
Fernando, 2011a), (Asai, Fernando & Castillo, 2011), (Fernando & Asai, 2011a), (Fernando & 
Asai, 2011b), not understanding or valuing ISM rules (Asai & Fernando, 2011b), (Fernando & 
Asai, 2011a), (Insight Express, 2008), and using any means to reach goals (Fernando & Asai, 
2011b). People’s beliefs and expectations may lead to mistakes and misjudgements of risks 
(Pronin, 2006). Thus, being the weakest link in the chain of security, people may 
unintentionally reveal confidential information to others. Schneier (2008) explains how the 
perception of security diverges from its reality and how people feel secure as long as there is 
no visible threat. This human weakness is exploited in most present-day attacks, which 
require a human element to be completed successfully (Williams, 2011). These attacks may 
come in the forms of social engineering, spear phishing or collusion from an insider, where 
people are tricked into revealing confidential information to others.  
1.2 Background
1.2.1 External Threat Detection vs. Insider Threat Detection 
Studies concerning Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) prevail in the field of information 
security. Yet, according to Lynch (2006), 60%-70% of attacks originate from the inside with 
the involvement of “trusted” folks. Grimes (2010) further states that, with the inclusion of 
users with non-malicious intent, the percentage of insiders wittingly or unwittingly involved 
in an attack reaches at least 80%. Additionally, internal attacks are also considered to be more 
4costly than external attacks. Thus, this research focuses on intentional or unintentional 
information sharing by authorized insiders having access rights to business information, with 
outsiders or other insiders not authorized to access that information. In order to differentiate 
between intrusion detection and detection of internal threats, the following subsections study 
these two areas in detail.  
1.2.1.1 Intrusion Detection 
Ning, Jajodia and Wang (2003) define an intrusion in an information system as “an activity 
that violates the security policy of the system”. They further explain that intrusion detection 
is the process to identify intrusions based on the belief that the intruder’s behaviour will be 
noticeably different from that of a legitimate user and that many unauthorized actions will be 
detectable. IDSs are a second line of defence and are usually deployed along with other 
preventive security mechanisms such as access control and authentication (Ning, et al., 2003).  
The two basic types of intrusion detection techniques are: 
Anomaly detection: detecting actions that significantly deviate from the normal 
behaviour of a subject, user or system 
Misuse detection: catches intrusions by detecting actions conforming to the patterns or 
characteristics of known attacks or system vulnerabilities (attack signatures) 
Ning, et al. (2003) classify IDSs as: 
Host-based IDS: gathers audit data from host audit trails aiming at detecting attacks 
against a single host 
Distributed IDS: gathers audit data from multiple hosts and possibly the network 
connecting the hosts to detect attacks involving multiple hosts 
Network-based IDS: uses network traffic as the audit data source, relieving the burden 
on hosts providing normal computing services 
1.2.1.2 Insider Threat Detection 
On the contrary, insider threat is defined by Liu, Martin, Hetherington and Matzner (2005) as 
“trusted users with legitimate access abusing system privileges” or as “intentionally 
5disruptive, unethical or illegal behaviour enacted by individuals possessing substantial 
internal access to organization’s information assets (current/former employees, contractors, 
other trusted parties) by Mills, Grimaila, Peterson and Butts (2011). Insider attacks are 
indistinguishable or difficult to distinguish from normal actions as inside attackers have 
authorization to access and use the system and these actions are less likely to require changes 
to normal operation of applications and processes (Liu, et al., 2005). Database administration, 
word processing, web browsing, command-prompt interaction etc. are considered as normal 
activities, while exploitation, extraction, manipulation, reconnaissance, access and 
entrenchment are categorized as malicious insider activities. Table 1.1 categorizes these 
exploits into different types. 
Mills, et al. (2011) further state that insider attacks are difficult to detect until after damage 
has been done and that attempts to solve these may exacerbate problems or introduce new 
problems. Yet, since most insider attacks are planned, there is a window of opportunity 
during which people can intervene before attack has occurred and prevent attack or limit 
damage (Mills, et al., 2011). 
Table 1.1 – Exploits Identified from Insider Taxonomy and Captured as Malicious Behaviour 
(Source: Liu, et al., 2005) 
Exploit Name Exploit Type Description 
Privilege-escalation Access/exploitation Exploit local applications to gain root access 
Removable media Extraction  Copy or “Save As…” protected data to a zip or thumb 
drive 
Export via e-mail Extraction  Send protected data via e-mail 
Change file extension Manipulation  Change file extension to confuse sensors 
Encipher / decipher Manipulation  Encrypt or decrypt protected documents 
Unusual search Reconnaissance  User looks for system files or protected documents 
Malware Entrenchment  User attempts to download and install malware 
1.2.2 Proactive & Sustainable Security 
Even though most technical security measures may be somewhat sufficient to keep the 
outside attacks at bay, technical measures alone are clearly insufficient to ward off insider 
attacks. Vroom & von Solms state that: “Human behaviour is not performed according to a 
6set of written rules, but according to the personality of the individual… However, this 
behaviour can be categorized” (Vroom & von Solms, 2003). Mills, et al. (2011) propose a 
holistic approach blending people, process and technology by focusing on behaviours and 
activities appearing to be risky using a combination of risk management, functional analysis 
of insider behaviours and risk mitigation (evaluation and selection of control measures). 
Table 1.2 depicts the observable behaviours listed by Mills, et al. (2011).
It is stated that although cyber activities only provide limited insight into intent and character, 
they are easier to collect, process and correlate automatically. Additionally, background 
checks provide deterrence, but require further scrutiny. It is a duel-edged sword which should 
be used sparingly as too much information could damage privacy (Mills, et al., 2011). 
Table 1.2 – Observables for Mitigating the Insider Threat (Source: Mills, et at., 2011) 
Observables 
Polygraph results 
Failure to report Finances, Travel, Contacts 
Violations 
Physical security 
Cyber security 
Physical access Entry logs, ID badges 
Foreign travel 
Personal conduct Finances, Wealth, Vices 
Materials transfer to handlers 
Social activity 
Internal 
External
Counterintelligence 
Communications 
Cyber activity 
Reconnaissance Web browsing, Database (DB) searches, Network scans 
Entrenchment Install sensors, Unauthorized software 
Exfiltration Printouts, Downloads, Removable media 
Communication Encrypted e-mails, Coded messages, Covert channels 
Manipulation Permissions, Change data, Overwrite / Delete files  
Counter detection 
Disk erasure, Overwrite / Deleting log files, Access human resource 
(HR) files 
Other actions Improper information technology (IT) use, Pornography, Gambling 
7Sabett (2011) states that any security system should be designed by accepting that the “bad 
guys” are already inside the system, and instead of having a hardened shell and a soft core, 
the most sensitive parts of the system or network should be hardened.   
Foley (2011) lists the following components as requirements for a proactive and sustainable 
security program: 
Preventive: “knowing your customer” (credentialing the employees, clients and 
vendors) and restricting access (authorization of identity, time and place) 
Detective: Auditing (user and subject reviews, random audits, risk-based audits and 
event-driven audits) and increasing security awareness and deterring 
inappropriate activity 
Monitoring (automated forensic review of transaction logs for patterns of 
increased activity, activity outside normal business hours, access from unusual 
locations and indication of data mining) 
Referrals (validate allegation and determine if the use was fraudulent or 
legitimate) 
Corrective: Levels (additional monitoring or auditing, update credentials, access 
restriction or access removal) determined by assessing the extent of direct 
contribution by client to the compromise, the risk associated with the compromise 
and the risk that same incident could be repeated 
Feedback: dynamic feedback (adjusting to changes in technology, legislation and 
threats), reactive and planned feedback, and creating and implementing solutions 
1.2.3 Risk Perception Awareness
Gonzalez and Sawicka (2002) states that accidents will not normally happen if security 
measures stay above a certain threshold and the risk is kept below the “accident zone”. In the 
typical life cycle of risk perception, perceived risk gradually declines when accidents do not 
occur as a consequence of improved security. Then the compliance with security measures 
also decline until system becomes vulnerable again. After a serious accident, risk perception 
soars, increasing compliance and starting a new cycle. This cycle (of perceived risk being out 
of phase with actual / current risk due to a perception delay, and accidents happening with 
increasing probability when current risk enters the accident zone) reoccurs a few times until a 
8fundamental lesson is learned (Gonzalez and Sawicka, 2002). Thus, they recommend risk 
perception renewals in order to sustain an appropriate level of risk perception through 
properly scheduled interventions such as security training and awareness programmes. 
The ISO/IEC 27001 (2005) emphasizes the importance of training, awareness and 
competence by stating “The organization shall ensure that all personnel who are assigned 
responsibilities defined in the information security management system (ISMS) are 
competent to perform the required tasks by determining the necessary competencies for 
personnel performing work affecting the ISMS, providing training or taking other actions to 
satisfy these needs, evaluating the effectiveness of the actions taken and maintaining records 
of education, training, skills, experience and qualifications… The organization will also 
ensure that all relevant personnel are aware of the relevance and importance of their 
information security activities and how they contribute to the achievement of the ISMS 
objectives”. 
Peltier (2002) states that the level of awareness should be considered when developing 
security awareness programmes: Employees may be divided based on their current level of 
awareness of the information security objectives. One method of determining levels of 
awareness is to conduct a “walkabout” after normal working hours to look for key indicators 
such as whether the offices, desks and cabinets are locked, workstations, information and 
recording media are secured, etc. Personnel may also be categorized according to job 
category, job function, their knowledge about information processing and technology, system 
or application used, as well as level of awareness. It further discusses the methods used to 
convey the awareness message. “Showing how to do it is the best method of training most 
employees. They like the hands-on approach and want someone to answer questions. The 
best method for awareness is to watch a video on the subject. The message should stimulate 
the senses of the audience. An informed outsider presenting the message is more successful 
than a known messenger doing so. Employees tend to question the credibility of fellow 
workers. Absentees should be noted.” It is further stated that awareness programmes must be 
scheduled around the work patterns of the audience and that the mornings on Tuesdays, 
Wednesdays or Thursdays would be the best (Peltier, 2002). 
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and technological methods and techniques to provide a managerial solution to address the 
problem of improper sharing of information by insiders with outsiders or unauthorized 
insiders, by monitoring the levels of observance of secure practices by the employees of an 
organization in order to create employee behavioural profiles by categorizing employees’ 
security behaviour, and thus identifying employees whose actions could potentially lead to 
ISM problems and therefore require special education and training in ISM. 
1.3 Related Work 
Even though this research suggests the incorporation of profiling of employees’ information 
security behaviour, criminal investigations is the prevailing area in the field of security where 
profiling is currently used. Thus, an understanding about criminal profiling will provide 
insight into profiling techniques which may be adaptable to information security.  
1.3.1 Criminal Profiling
Criminal profiling is defined by Young and Varano (2006) as an investigative approach based 
on the premise that the crime scene provides details about the offense and the offender. It is 
used in investigations of homicide, sexual assault, arson, etc. Thompson (2011) defines 
criminal profiling as “the careful evaluation of physical evidence (collected and analyzed by 
a team of specialists from different areas) for systematically reconstructing the crime scene 
and developing a strategy to assist in capturing the offender and aiding trial, focusing on 
weeding out suspects, developing investigative strategy, linking crimes and suspects, and 
assessing risk”. Based on the premise that “every criminal works to a certain set of values”, 
criminal profiling is used to classify behavioural patterns and predict the next move assuming 
that offenders engaged in crime sprees devolve from lucid state of mind into a pathological 
state of frenzied criminality (Claridge, 2012). Examples of practical investigations which 
used criminal profiling include “Jack the Ripper”, “New York Mad Bomber” and predicting 
Adolf Hitler’s possible reactions during World War II (Young & Varano, 2006).  
Criminal profiling entails examining evidence from crime scenes and victim and witness 
reports to develop an offender description containing (Winerman, 2004):  
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Psychological variables: personality traits, psychopathologies and behaviour patterns
Demographic variables: age, race, gender, emotional age, marital status, socioeconomic 
level, occupation, level of education, arrest and offense history, geographic location or 
residence relative to crime scene etc. 
Criminal profiling uses geographic and psychological typologies to create a profile that 
isolates offender characteristics. Summarized below is the discussion of these typologies by 
Young and Varano (2006): 
Geographically-based techniques: focus on the location of the crime scene to locate 
offender’s home base by mapping offense locations. The “marauder” is an offender who 
branches out from a centralized home base to commit an offense, then returns to base. The 
“commuter” travels from a home base outside the offense area, while the “drifter” travels 
without a permanent base. The marauder and commuter models are familiar with the offense 
area. The commuter has access to transportation methods. Lack of financial backing 
geographically limits the criminal. Investigative psychology builds on geographic approach 
by analyzing additional crime scene variables (Young & Varano, 2006). 
Psychologically-based techniques: compile psychological background using crime scene 
details and observable behaviours of offender’s traits. Behaviour is interpreted from the 
presence or absence of forensic elements such as use of weapons and restraints, status of 
clothing, physical state of body, location of body disposal, means of approaching victim, etc. 
The “organized non­social offender” commits a planned crime and displays forensic 
awareness. This is usually a socially skilled, highly intelligent person maintaining a skilled 
occupation. The “disorganized asocial offender” leaves behind a disorganized scene and is 
usually a lone, isolated person with low impulse control and low financial credibility. Apart 
from the organized / disorganized dichotomy, psychological typologies are further classified 
into subcategories based on motivational factors (visionary, mission style, hedonistic or 
power-control type) and offense behaviours (power reassurance, power assertive, anger 
retaliatory or anger-excitation).  
Criminal investigative analysis employs psychological typologies along with complete 
victimology (study of victims in many crimes perpetrated by the same criminal), police 
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reports, witness statements, autopsy reports, forensic reports, crime scene photographs to 
classify homicide type and construct profile, determine presence or absence of elements, 
amount of planning, degree of control, changes in emotional state during crime, risk level etc. 
Behavioural evidence analysis is a deductive approach where crime is studied individually as 
opposed to in comparison with previous cases, and a timeline is constructed and offender’s 
behavioural choices, modus operandi and signature behaviours are evaluated. The resulting 
profile also includes evidence of criminal skill, relationship to victim, knowledge of crime 
scene’s dynamics, familiarity with materials, and logical reasoning or justification for 
conclusions (Young & Varano, 2006).
Turvey (2000) states that inductive criminal profiling entails broad generalization and 
statistical reasoning and is thus subjective. On the other hand, deductive criminal profiling 
based on behavioural evidence analysis is preferred since it is a dynamic process which could 
be used to capture successful criminals whose methods either become more refined or 
deteriorated over time (Turvey, 2000). 
Winerman (2004) states that the organized / disorganized dichotomy developed in 1974 by 
the behavioural science unit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is challenged by 
psychologists who state that almost all serial murderers show some level of organization and 
that these core variables are frequently seen. These psychologists further state that the 
differences are seen in disorganized behaviours such as sexual control, mutilation and 
plunder, which divide criminals into categories. They suggest crime action profiling for 
developing models based on large studies (Winerman, 2004). 
1.4 Research Objectives 
This research addresses the problem of improper sharing of information by insiders with 
outsiders or unauthorized insiders and proposes a managerial solution, which employs a mix 
of technological and social methods and techniques to achieve internal control of information 
and communication within an organization. This solution entails security behavioural 
profiling, by monitoring cyber and non-cyber activities of users to detect the levels of 
observance of security best practices by the employees of the organization, detecting patterns 
among these behaviours, and using this information together with background information 
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and job details to create security behavioural profiles of users, to provide suggestions to 
information security officers and security managers to help identify users who might 
potentially pose threats to the organization’s information security. Since insider attacks are 
difficult to detect using conventional intrusion detection techniques such as anomaly or 
misuse detection, a profiling system to predict potential behavioural patterns takes a step 
towards enabling insider threat detection. Further, the proposed solution will determine the 
level of security education or guidance to be given to each employee and schedule security 
education and training programmes will. In addition, periodic risk perception renewals will 
be scheduled in order to maintain the level of risk perception within an appropriate limit.  
The next chapter discusses research methodology and explains how it is incorporated in this 
research. Chapter 3 provides the detailed explanation of the proposed concept and chapter 4 
explains the design, implementation, and testing of the system to prove the feasibility of the 
concept proposed through this research, and discusses the engineering challenges faced, 
while the evaluation of system usability is discussed in chapter 5. Finally, chapter 6 
summarizes this research, and states the conclusions of this research and future work which 
may be carried out.   
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Chapter 2 
Research Methodology 
2.1 Introduction 
This research addresses the human-related information security problem of improper 
information sharing and presents a workable solution to predict the information security 
behaviour of employees of an organization by categorizing their behavioural patterns and 
profiling their security behaviour. In order to do so, it is important to gain an in-depth 
understanding of human behavioural heuristics and personalities. Thus, the subsequent 
subsections discuss these aspects of human behaviour. The rest of this chapter studies the 
methodology adapted in this research to profile human behaviour. 
2.1.1 Human Behavioural Heuristics 
According to the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), humans 
are a species living in the company of other humans. The AAAS (1990) states that human 
behaviour is affected by humans. Humans are organized into social groupings in which they 
live. Deliberate changes in social behaviour and organization over time are combined with 
socialization, resulting in different complex and dynamic patterns of human society across 
space, time and cultures. Social scientists study human behaviour from cultural, political, 
economic and psychological perspectives, looking for consistent patterns of individual and 
social behaviour and both scientific and genetic inheritance and experience. The 
characteristics of the social and cultural setting, such as family, community, social class, 
language and religion a person is born into affect how he thinks and behaves. In addition to 
the means of instruction, example, and rewards and punishment, one’s thoughts and 
behaviour are also influenced by informal interactions with friends, peers, relatives and media. 
Technology has always played a major role in human behaviour, leading to rapid spread of 
fashions and ideas through international travel and mass media, and implicitly promoting 
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values, aspirations, priorities and attitudes. Acceptable human behaviour varies from culture 
to culture and time to time. Unusual behaviour could be considered amusing, distasteful or 
punishable. For instance, aggressively competitive behaviour is considered rude in highly 
cooperative cultures, while lack of competition is regarded lazy in others.  
West (2008) explains how risk and uncertainty are difficult concepts for people to evaluate. 
“Fundamentally, the user problem in security systems is about how people think of risks that 
guide their behaviour… Basic principles of human behaviour that govern how users think 
about security in everyday situations show why they undermine security accidents.” 
Predictable and exploitable characteristics in the human decision-making process include the 
belief that they are at less risk, risk homeostasis (maintaining an acceptable degree of risk and 
increasing risky behaviour to suit increased security measures), cognitive miserliness (having 
a limited capacity for information processing and multitasking) leading to quick, uninformed 
decisions based on learned rules and heuristics, feeling less motivated by abstract concepts 
like security, incorrect evaluations of trade-off between security and cost, and perceiving loss 
disproportionately to gains. West (2008) concludes that for many people, security becomes a 
priority only when they have problems with it. This study clarifies why people from different 
cultures react in different ways concerning information security. 
Bruce Schneier (2008) conducts a closer examination of these heuristics. He states that 
“security is both a feeling and a reality”.  While the reality is mathematical, based on the 
probability of different risks and effectiveness of different countermeasures, the feeling is 
based on one’s psychological reactions to risks and countermeasures. One can be secure 
without feeling secure (paranoia), and vice versa. Schneier (2008) attempts to find why this 
feeling of security diverges from the reality by researching about behavioural economics 
(emotional, social and cognitive human biases), psychology of decision-making and bounded 
rationality, psychology of risk and risk perception, and neuroscience (how human brains have 
developed complex mechanisms to deal with threats). Any gain in security involves trade-
offs in terms of money, time, convenience, capabilities or liberties. Humans make trade-offs 
intuitively, exaggerating some risks or costs, while downplaying others. Aspects of trade-off 
such as the severity of the risk, probability of the risk, magnitude of the costs, effectiveness 
of countermeasures at mitigating the risk, and comparison of disparate risks and costs, can go 
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wrong. The more the perception diverges from reality, the more the perceived trade-off 
diverges from the actual trade-off. Reasons for incorrect perception of risks are listed in 
Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 – Conventional Wisdom about People and Risk Perception (Source: Schneier, 
2008)
Exaggerated risks Downplayed risks 
Spectacular Pedestrian 
Rare Common 
Personified Anonymous 
Beyond their control or externally imposed More under their control or taken willingly 
Talked about Not discussed 
Intentional or man-made Natural 
Immediate Long-term or diffuse 
Sudden Evolving slowly over time 
Affecting them personally Affecting others 
New and unfamiliar Familiar 
Uncertain Well understood 
Directed against their children Directed towards themselves 
Morally offensive Morally desirable 
Entirely without redeeming features Associated with some ancillary benefit 
Not like their current situation Like their current situation 
Human risk perception fails because new situations have occurred at a faster rate than human 
evolution (Schneier, 2008). The “amygdala”, a primitive part of the brain, processes base 
emotions from sensory inputs like anger, avoidance, defensiveness, and fear, triggering the 
fight-or-flight response. Yet, some situations are better handled by sophisticated analysis of 
situation and options using the “neocortex”, a recently developed part of the brain in 
mammals. Having two systems operating in parallel makes people feel both rational and 
flighty at the same time. Unfortunately, this newer innovation of the brain is still in its early 
stages of development, resulting in many miscalculations. Instead of evaluating security 
trade-offs mathematically, humans use shortcuts, rules of thumb, stereotypes, and biases, 
known as heuristics, to generate answers quickly, with limited cognitive capabilities. 
Schneier (2008) explains these heuristics and theories through many scientifically conducted 
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experiments. These behavioural heuristics, which may affect the way people react to ISM-
related problems, are summarized in the remainder of this subsection.  
2.1.1.1 Risk Heuristics 
Prospect Theory – Kahneman and Tversky (1979) state that humans accept small sure 
gains rather than risking / chancing a larger gain, and risk / chance larger losses rather 
than accepting smaller sure losses 
Endowment Effect – humans value something more when represented as something that 
can be lost, as opposed to a potential gain 
Optimism Bias and Control Bias – humans believe that good outcomes are more 
probable than bad outcomes, and are more likely to accept risks they feel they have some 
control over
Affect Heuristic – an overall good feeling toward a situation leads to a lower risk 
perception, while an overall bad feeling leads to a higher risk perception 
2.1.1.2 Probability Heuristics 
Small numbers matter more than large numbers (a half, a quarter, one eighth, or almost 
nothing)
Availability Heuristic and Hindsight Bias – humans consider something that is more 
available to be more probable (common events, vivid and salient arguments) and 
consider events that have actually occurred previously to be more probable 
Representativeness and Law of Small Numbers – humans assume that the probability 
that an example belongs to a particular class is based on how closely that example 
represents the class, and that long-term probabilities also hold true in the short run 
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2.1.1.3 Cost Heuristics 
Mental Accounting – humans have different mental budgets and may be willing to accept 
considerable risks in one mental account, but would not consider them if charged against 
a different account 
Time Discounting – humans tend to discount future costs and benefits 
Magnitude Effect – smaller amounts are discounted more than larger ones 
Framing Effect – framing something as an acceleration or a delay from a base reference 
point
2.1.1.4 Decision Heuristics 
Context Effect – humans tend to choose options that dominate other options, or 
compromise options that lie between other options (avoiding extremes) 
Choice Bracketing – humans choose a more diverse set of items when the decision is 
bracketed more broadly than when bracketed more narrowly 
Anchoring Effect – human decisions are affected by random information cognitively 
nearby (mentally adjusting facts to suit facts anchored in their minds) 
Confirmation Bias – humans are more likely to notice evidence supporting a previously 
held position rather than evidence that discredits it 
2.1.2 Personality Types 
Lacey (2009) states that the Myres-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) tool could be used to 
categorize human psychological types, which may explain the information security behaviour 
of different employees of an organization. This subsection discusses how different 
behavioural traits linked to different human personality types may be categorized. 
Carl Jung’s Theory of Psychological Types, introduced in the 1920s, states that much 
seemingly random variation in behaviour is actually quite orderly and consistent, being due to 
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basic differences in the way individuals prefer to use their perception and judgement. 
According to the Myers & Briggs Foundation, MBTI, developed by Isabel Briggs Myers and 
Katharine Briggs in the 1940s, makes this theory understandable and useful. MBTI is based 
on Jung’s ideas about perception and judgement and the attitudes in which these are used in 
different types of people, to identify basic preferences of each of the four dichotomies 
specified or implicit in Jung’s theory and to identify and describe the sixteen distinctive 
personality types resulting from the interactions among the preferences. ‘Perception’ is 
defined as “all the ways of becoming aware of things, people, happenings or ideas”, while 
‘Judgement’ is defined as “all the ways of coming to conclusions about what has been 
perceived.” It is further stated that if people differ systematically in what they perceive and in 
how they reach conclusions, then it is only reasonable for them to differ correspondingly in 
their interests, reactions, values, motivations, and skills (The Myers & Briggs Foundation). 
The four dichotomies explained by the Myers & Briggs Foundation are summarized below: 
Favourite world: Extraversion or Introversion (E-I) are mutually complementary 
attitudes. The tension generated by the differences is needed for maintenance of life. 
“Extraverts” are oriented primarily toward the outer world and tend to focus their 
perception and judgement on people and objects, while “introverts” are primarily 
oriented toward the inner world and tend to focus their perception and judgement upon 
concepts and ideas. 
Information: Sensing or Intuition (S-N) are opposite ways of perceiving information, 
either focusing on basic information or interpreting and adding meaning. “Sensing” relies 
primarily upon the process of sensing, which reports observable facts or happenings 
through one or more of the five senses, while “intuition” relies upon the less obvious 
process of intuition, which reports meanings, relationships and / or possibilities that have 
been worked out beyond the reach of the conscious mind.  
Decisions: Thinking or Feeling (T-F) are contrasting ways of judgement, either looking 
at logic and consistency or looking at people and special circumstances. “Thinking” 
relies primarily on thinking to decide impersonally on the basis of logical consequences, 
while “feeling” relies on feelings to decide primarily on the basis of personal or social 
value.
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Structure: Judging or Perceiving (J-P) are processes used in dealing with the outer world 
(i.e.: the extraverted part of life). “Judging” uses a judgement process (either “thinking” 
or “feeling”) for dealing with the outer world and thus get things decided, while 
“perceiving” uses a perceptive process (either “sensing” or “intuition”) for dealing with 
the outer world and stay open to new information and options. 
One pole of each of the four preferences is preferred (dominant) over the other pole 
(auxiliary) and these preferences on each index are independent of preferences for the other 
three indices. Thus, the four indices yield sixteen possible combinations called “types”, with 
each type having its own pattern of dominant and auxiliary processes and the attitudes (E or 
I) in which these are habitually used. The characteristics of each type follow from the 
dynamic interplay of these processes and attitudes (The Myers & Briggs Foundation). Table 
2.2  lists these sixteen personality types. 
Table 2.2 – The Sixteen Personality Types (Source: The Myers & Briggs Foundation) 
ISTJ ISFJ INFJ INTJ 
ISTP ISFP INFP INTP 
ESTP ESFP ENFP ENTP 
ESTJ ESFJ ENFJ ENTJ 
 The Myers & Briggs Foundation classifies these 16 personality types as having the 
characteristics listed in table 2.3. Lacey (2009) states that the ideal profile for a criminal 
mastermind INTJ, a highly organized planner and capable leader. These types are rare in the 
general population, but are found in a few IT directors (Lacey, 2009). He further states that a 
lone fraudster, being a shy, analytic loner in good company would likely belong to the INTP 
type. Carl Jung, himself, was of INTP type (Lacey, 2009). 
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Table 2.3 – Characteristics of the Sixteen Personality Types (Source: The Myers & Briggs 
Foundation)
Type Characteristics of Personality 
ISTJ 
Quiet, serious, earn success by thoroughness and dependability. Practical, matter-of-fact, realistic, and 
responsible. Decide logically what should be done and work toward it steadily, regardless of 
distractions. Take pleasure in making everything orderly and organized – their work, their home, their 
life. Value traditions and loyalty. 
ISFJ 
Quiet, friendly, responsible, and conscientious. Committed and steady in meeting their obligations. 
Thorough, painstaking, and accurate. Loyal, considerate, notice and remember specifics about people 
who are important to them, concerned with how others feel. Strive to create an orderly and harmonious 
environment at work and at home. 
INFJ 
Seek meaning and connection in ideas, relationships, and material possessions. Want to understand 
what motivates people and are insightful about others. Conscientious and committed to their firm 
values. Develop a clear vision about how best to serve the common good. Organized and decisive in 
implementing their vision. 
INTJ 
Have original minds and great drive for implementing their ideas and achieving their goals. Quickly see 
patterns in external events and develop long-range explanatory perspectives. When committed, 
organize a job and carry it through. Skeptical and independent, have high standards of competence and 
performance – for themselves and for others. 
ISTP 
Tolerant and flexible, quiet observers until a problem appears, then act quickly to find workable 
solutions. Analyze what makes things work and readily get through large amounts of data to isolate the 
core of practical problems. Interested in cause and effect, organize facts using logical principles, value 
efficiency.
ISFP 
Quiet, friendly, sensitive, and kind. Enjoy the present moment, what’s going on around them. Like to 
have their own space and to work within their own time frame. Loyal and committed to their values 
and to people who are important to them. Dislike disagreements and conflicts, do not force their 
opinions or values on others. 
INFP 
Idealistic, loyal to their values and to people who are important to them. Want an external life that is 
congruent with their values. Curious, quick to see possibilities, can be catalysts for implementing ideas. 
Seek to understand people and to help them fulfil their potential. Adaptable, flexible, and accepting 
unless a value is threatened. 
INTP 
Seek to develop logical explanations for everything that interests them. Theoretical and abstract, 
interested more in ideas than in social interaction. Quiet, contained, flexible, and adaptable. Have 
unusual ability to focus in depth to solve problems in their area of interest. Skeptical, sometimes 
critical, always analytical. 
ESTP 
Flexible and tolerant, they take a pragmatic approach focused on immediate results. Theories and 
conceptual explanations bore them – they want to act energetically to solve the problem. Focus on the 
here-and-now, spontaneous, enjoy each moment that they can be active with others. Enjoy material 
comforts and style. Learn best through doing. 
ESFP 
Outgoing, friendly, and accepting. Exuberant lovers of life, people, and material comforts. Enjoy 
working with others to make things happen. Bring common sense and a realistic approach to their 
work, and make work fun. Flexible and spontaneous, adapt readily to new people and environments. 
Learn best by trying a new skill with other people. 
ENFP 
Warmly enthusiastic and imaginative. See life as full of possibilities. Make connections between 
events and information very quickly, and confidently proceed based on the patterns they see. Want a 
lot of affirmation from others, and readily give appreciation and support. Spontaneous and flexible, 
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often rely on their ability to improvise and their verbal fluency. 
ENTP 
Quick, ingenious, stimulating, alert, and outspoken. Resourceful in solving new and challenging 
problems. Adept at generating conceptual possibilities and then analyzing them strategically. Good at 
reading other people. Bored by routine, will seldom do the same thing the same way, apt to turn to one 
new interest after another. 
ESTJ 
Practical, realistic, matter-of-fact. Decisive, quickly move to implement decisions. Organize projects 
and people to get things done, focus on getting results in the most efficient way possible. Take care of 
routine details. Have a clear set of logical standards, systematically follow them and want others to 
also. Forceful in implementing their plans. 
ESFJ 
Warm-hearted, conscientious, and cooperative. Want harmony in their environment, work with 
determination to establish it. Like to work with others to complete tasks accurately and on time. Loyal, 
follow through even in small matters. Notice what others need in their day-by-day lives and try to 
provide it. Want to be appreciated for who they are and for what they contribute. 
ENFJ 
Warm, empathetic, responsive, and responsible. Highly attuned to the emotions, needs, and 
motivations of others. Find potential in everyone, want to help others fulfil their potential. May act as 
catalysts for individual and group growth. Loyal, responsive to praise and criticism. Sociable, facilitate 
others in a group, and provide inspiring leadership. 
ENTJ 
Frank, decisive, assume leadership readily. Quickly see illogical and inefficient procedures and 
policies, develop and implement comprehensive systems to solve organizational problems. Enjoy long-
term planning and goal setting. Usually well informed, well read, enjoy expanding their knowledge 
and passing it on to others. Forceful in presenting their ideas. 
Lacey (2009) emphasizes that MBTI can indicate who is likely to commit a fraud, but cannot 
explicitly state who will commit a fraud. In this research MBTI is used for validating the 
behaviours profiled by the developed system. 
2.2 Adapted Methodology 
Of the different candidate theoretical models, frameworks, and approaches, such as rule-
based inference systems, Hidden Markov Model, machine learning, etc, that could be adapted 
by this system for profiling information security behaviour, the most appropriate approach for 
developing this knowledge system was rule-based inference systems, because of their ability 
to simulate the process of human decision-making. The following subsection explains this 
methodology in detail.  
2.2.1 Rule-Based Inference System 
As opposed to traditional programming systems, which are sequential and follow a fixed 
execution path, in rule-based inference systems, the next rule to be executed is determined by 
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the knowledge within (Enterra Solutions, 2014). Allowing the knowledge to be expressed in a 
pure form and invoking the applicable rule is an ideal way of programming a knowledge 
system simulating human thought (Enterra Solution, 2014). In a rule-based inference system, 
the user provides information about the problem to be solved and the system attempts to 
provide insights derived or inferred from examining the knowledgebase (Griffin & Lewis, 
1989). According to Platt (2000), the expertise used by a person to perform an expert task can 
often be represented as rules. Rule-based inference systems allow a collection of discrete rule 
to represent judgemental knowledge regarding a specific problem, where each rule states that 
if certain premises are known, then certain conclusions can be inferred (Duda, Hart, Nilsson 
& Sutherland, 1977).
These rules (also known as production rules) are of the following form: 
 if <conditions> then <actions> 
where, the actions are executed if the conditions are satisfied (Griffin & Lewis, 1989). The 
set of statements following the word “if” represent observable patterns, whereas, the 
statements following the word “then” represents conclusions that may be drawn or actions 
that may be taken based on those conclusions (Platt, 2000). Thus, a rule-based inference 
system identifies a pattern and draws conclusions regarding its meaning and / or advises the 
actions needed to be taken regarding it, thus, making a rule-based inference system, the best 
approach for this research.
Similar to a human following a chain of ideas to reach a conclusion, a rule-based reasoning 
system goes through a series of cycles, producing new information through the execution of 
each rule, and thereby, taking the reasoning process further in each cycle (Platt, 2000). The 
radical difference between a conventional software program containing an “if… then…” 
structure and a production system, is that a production system can choose a rule appropriate 
to the current circumstances from the knowledgebase to execute. The “recognize­act cycle” 
of an inference engine checks for matches between the data in the working memory and the 
condition of a rule to fire that particular rule (Platt, 2000). Since knowledge can easily be 
expressed as a set of production rules, they provide notational convenience, and the rule base 
could be expanded by simply adding more rules at the end of the rule base (Platt, 2000).
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There are two methods of inference used by rule-based inference systems (Griffin & Lewis, 
1989):
Forward chaining: a top-down exploration method, which considers facts as they become 
available and attempts to draw conclusions from and execute actions of the rules that 
have all their conditions satisfied 
Backward chaining: a bottom-up verification procedure, which begins with the goals / 
actions and queries the user about information which may satisfy the conditions 
contained in the appropriate rules 
A forward chaining process will be used in simulating a game of chess where it begins with 
the current facts – the position of the pieces on the chess board – and applies rules of piece­ 
movement in a goal-directed way to attempt to checkmate the opponent (Enterra Solutions, 
2014). An example for backward chaining is when the user begins with an objective and 
reasons backward to figure out how to satisfy that objective, such as figuring out whether to 
buy or bake a cake if the user wants to eat cake and figuring out a store, transportation to get 
to the store, the cost, etc. in order to conclude whether to buy or bake the cake (Enterra 
Solutions, 2014).
The implementation of the system proposed through this research uses a forward chaining 
process to profile user information security behaviour based on the observed or monitored 
behavioural characteristics and schedules security education and training accordingly. As a 
conflict resolution strategy to decide which rules are fired first, this system uses the method 
where the rules listed first are executed first if all of their conditions are satisfied. 
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Chapter 3 
Proposed Concept 
3.1 Introduction
The system proposed through this research to achieve internal control of information and 
communication within an organization is explained in detail in this section.
This system addresses the threat of improper sharing of information, both intentional and 
unintentional, by authorized insiders, with outsiders or other unauthorized insiders. Even 
though most systems acknowledge the importance of focusing on the human factor in 
information security, most currently available efforts focus on technological solutions only. 
Yet, people easily bypass technological controls and restrictions. Thus, this research proposes 
a managerial solution employing a mix of social and technological methods and techniques 
by monitoring the level of observance of secure practices by the employees of an 
organization, creating user behavioural profiles based on this data along with background 
information and job details, identifying users whose behaviour might lead to security 
problems and infractions in the future and providing them with education and training in ISM. 
3.2 Overall System
Lacey (2009) has pointed out that curtailing or limiting the personal browsing ability of 
employees is detrimental to their productivity. Yet, depending on the project(s) the employee 
is working on and the criticality of the business information the employee has to access, it is 
sometimes mandatory to restrict web browsing and access to the Internet in order to protect 
the security of the business information used for the project. In some instances, the clients 
themselves request such restrictions. This system addresses this problem by providing two 
separate modes: the “strict” mode and the “relaxed” mode. 
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During the “strict” mode, which is the default mode: 
Only pre-specified programs and services are allowed (all others are denied) 
All activities are monitored 
All activities are logged 
All retrievals, printing and copying of information are logged and copies of files are 
tagged
Only work-related activities are allowed 
No personal browsing, personal e-mails or instant messaging etc. are allowed 
All information exchanges (e-mail contents, e-mail attachments, file sharing etc.) are 
recorded 
The “relaxed” mode must specifically be activated and these activation and deactivation 
times are logged and used for profiling and performance evaluations. During the “relaxed” 
mode:
Personal browsing, personal e-mails, instant messaging etc. are allowed 
Personal activities are not monitored (to protect user privacy) 
No access to work-related information (databases etc.) are allowed 
E-mail attachments and file sharing are recorded 
Contents of excessively long e-mails are recorded 
The use of two separate modes also helps to address the privacy implications produced by 
monitoring user activity, by clearly distinguishing between the times when monitoring will or 
will not take place. Having only two separate modes allows for higher productivity and 
minimizes privacy concerns while maintaining simplicity by avoiding complications 
produced by a multi-modal system containing a multitude of different modes. 
The subsequent subsections explain the system functions and the user classes of the proposed 
system and their characteristics in detail. 
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3.2.1  System Functions
The system will constantly monitor for extraordinary behaviour: 
Excessive access to information, services or systems 
Untimely access to information, services or systems 
Access from remote terminals 
Trying to access data of a higher classification level than the user’s security clearance 
level
Trying to access data for which the user has no Need­to­Know according to the user’s 
job description 
Once such extraordinary behaviour is detected, the system will automatically switch to strict 
mode. Switching back to relaxed mode once an automatic switch has occurred requires 
permission from the Information Security Officer (ISO) or a security manager. The system 
automatically monitors all user access to digitized information. It is important to note that 
even though the information concerned is not digitized, the proposed system can provide 
useful information, to a certain extent, to detect malicious access because the system has a 
function which allows employees’ managers or security personnel of the organization to 
observe employees’ access to not only digitized data, but also to non-digitized / non-machine-
readable data. The behavioural traits observed through the monitoring of cyber and non-cyber 
access to information, and predicted through the compiled security behavioural profiles, may 
also give an indication of the likelihood that an employee would share human-readable 
information or mental information with others. 
The system will also constantly monitor cyber and non-cyber activities of its employees to 
determine their levels of observance of best practices. In order to cover as many categories of 
security behaviour as possible, the following aspects are looked into: 
Password Security Behaviour:
Password strength (difficulty of remembering password, difficulty of guessing password, 
obviousness, etc.) 
Frequency of changing password 
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Reuse of former passwords 
Whether the password is saved 
Whether the password is often mistyped 
Whether the password is often forgotten 
Time taken to type password 
Time taken to get used to typing a new password 
Whether the same password is shared across different applications 
Whether passwords are shared with others 
Data Backup Behaviour:
Frequency of data backup (both company data and personal data, and both hard backup 
and soft backup) 
Whether the backup naming conventions are properly observed 
Data Sanitization Behaviour:
Whether unnecessary copies of data are destroyed (both hard copies and soft copies) 
Sanitization of external storage media 
Whether access to personal storage media is controlled (whether they are lent to or freely 
accessible by others, whether they are used from different terminals, etc.) 
Use of others’ storage media (whether they are scanned before using, whether they are 
sanitized before returning, etc.) 
Whether temp files, cookies, history, saved passwords, etc. are deleted 
Network Security Behaviour:
Whether firewalls are enabled (whether they are relaxed to allow different applications 
access to the system, whether privilege is escalated to allow installation of software, 
whether escalated privileges are reset after installation of programs, etc.) 
Whether antivirus software is periodically updated 
Whether computers are periodically scanned 
Checking authenticity of websites, e-mail attachments, etc. before clicking on links or 
opening attachments 
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Validating credentials of people before correspondence 
Physical Security Behaviour:
Visibility of monitor 
Awareness of surrounding (whether others such as maintenance crew, janitors, etc. are 
around)
Locking computer when leaving the desk 
Locking cupboards, desks, office, vehicle, etc. 
Whether confidential or personal items are left behind unattended (documents, 
computers, storage media, password hints, etc.) 
Whether personal items are shared with others 
Whether unknown items are used without validation 
Forgetting, lending or borrowing keys 
Cyber activities of users such as password renewal frequency, reuse of former passwords, 
password strength, data back-up frequency etc. will be regularly monitored automatically by 
the security system. Non-cyber activities such as whether the users leave confidential 
documents lying around, whether doors are locked, whether they talk openly about work-
related things with co-workers etc. will be monitored personally by their managers or the 
security personnel of the organization. Cyber activity monitored by the system will be stored 
separately, in parallel with other non-cyber activities monitored by managers and security 
personnel. Managers and security personnel can perform a walk-through after office hours to 
gather information about non-cyber activities.  
Non-cyber activity and background information will be personally inputted into the system 
by managers, security personnel and human resource (HR) managers: 
Personal views about the behaviour of employees will be inputted by the managers and 
security personnel. This information will help in identifying personality traits of 
employees, whether they feel isolated from their peers, whether they feel pressurized 
under competition, whether they can be easily enticed or tricked into revealing 
information, etc.
Information from background checks before employment and periodically during 
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employment are inputted to the system by human resource managers. These include: 
contact details, financial status and stability, number of dependents, educational level, 
criminal record, etc. This information will help in identifying users that might be enticed 
to reveal information for financial or career-wise incentives etc.
Employee’s job description will be inputted or updated by his manager according to the 
project(s) the employee is currently working on. Responsibility entailing the job and the 
records of performance evaluations will be included. This information would help in 
identifying users that try to access information above their security clearance level or for 
which they do not have a Need-to-Know, and users that might be enticed to reveal 
information for career-wise incentives etc.
This information, together with other cyber-activity related information automatically 
gathered by the system is used for profiling and for finding the behavioural types each of the 
employees belong to. The resulting security behavioural profiles will include: 
The security consciousness of the employee 
The extent of understanding of the security policy by the employee 
The value given to ISM rules and procedures by the employee and the extent of 
adherence to policies 
How easily information is revealed to others 
How easily an employee can be enticed or tricked into revealing information to others 
Employee’s ambitiousness and drive to move ahead in his or her career 
Employee’s sociability, capability to work in a team and respect gained by peers 
The potential of an employee to intentionally or unintentionally reveal or improperly 
share confidential information with others 
Whether the employee has any motive or incentive (financial, career-wise, social, 
psychological or personal) to access unauthorized information or reveal information to 
others
Through the behavioural profiles created, the system then provides suggestions to the ISO / 
security managers to help them identify potentially problematic employees, and determines 
the level of education, training or guidance on security awareness required by them. 
Depending on the extent of problematic behaviour, awareness and training programmes could 
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range from pop-up notifications to workshops conducted by security professionals. The 
extent of the required awareness and training programme is calculated and determined by the 
system. If pop-up security awareness reminders or visual aids such as presentations are 
sufficient, the system automatically conducts these awareness programmes through the 
identified employee’s computer. If more extensive training programmes or workshops are 
required, the system schedules such programmes and notifies the security managers, who 
then conduct such programmes with the help of outside security professionals. In addition to 
planned and scheduled awareness and training programmes for identified problematic users, 
the system also periodically schedules awareness and training programmes for all users at 
random intervals, in order to maintain a high level or security awareness by all employees. 
Based on the resulting behavioural profiles the security awareness, guidance, or training may 
be:
Planned and scheduled awareness and training programmes for identified potentially 
problematic users 
Randomly scheduled awareness and training programmes for all users, periodically, as 
risk perception renewals to maintain the desired level of security awareness 
In the case of extensively problematic behaviour by an employee being detected by the 
system, it immediately alerts the ISO in real-time so that he or she may act immediately 
and take the necessary steps to prevent the security breach or minimize the damages 
incurred by the breach. The ISO may take steps such as immediately barring access to 
the system, services, network and organization’s information by the identified employee, 
and informing the relevant authorities such as police and federal agents, depending on 
the severity of the breach and incurred damage. 
The security managers and the ISO can request to view behavioural profiles and security 
education and training schedules in the following ways: 
Security managers and the ISO can request to view behavioural profiles of users in 
summarized, detailed or graphical form 
Training schedules for employees can also be viewed by security managers and the ISO 
The ISO can additionally also request separate views of automatically monitored (cyber-
activity-related) data and personally inputted (non-cyber-activity-related) data and thus 
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use his or her personal judgement to avoid any personal bias the managers or security 
personnel might have towards any employee 
Figure 3.1 depicts the top-level architectural design of the proposed system. 
Figure 3.1 – Top­Level Architectural Design of the Proposed System 
Given below are some possible example scenarios of detecting problematic employees using 
this proposed system:  
Employee A is a senior accountant in charge of handling employee salaries. She is 
financially well established with good academic and professional qualifications and is at 
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the peak of her career. Yet, if a colleague asks to use her computer for some personal 
purpose, she provides them with her authentication information in order to help them. 
Employee A has no career-wise, personal, or financial motives for intentional violation of 
the company’s information security. Yet, she can be easily tricked into revealing 
confidential information and thus, is an easy target of social engineering. She needs a 
security training workshop to make her understand the risks of a security breach, along 
with periodic automatic reminders of secure information sharing practices. 
Employee B is a software analyst and is in serious financial crisis. He tries to access 
employee salary information for which he has no Need-to-Know. Employee B may be 
trying to intentionally violate the confidentiality and integrity of the organization’s salary 
information. The ISO must closely monitor his activities and de-escalate his privileges and 
security clearance to restrict access. 
3.2.2  User Classes & Characteristics 
The different user classes in this system and their characteristics are as follows: 
Employees – Do not input any information into the system. Their cyber activities are 
monitored by the system and behavioural patterns are detected. Direct interaction with the 
system occurs only when the system provides automatic security awareness training to the 
employees in the form of either pop-up reminders or visual aids.
Managers – Observe employees working under them and input their personal views about 
the employees’ security consciousness and non­cyber behaviour in to the system. They 
also input or update the employees’ job titles, job descriptions and Need-to-Know 
depending on the projects they are currently working on.
Security Personnel – Observe employees and input their personal views about the 
employees’ security consciousness and non-cyber behaviour in to the system.
Human Resource Managers – Conduct background checks on employees during 
recruitment and periodically thereafter and input background information to the system.
Security Managers – View summaries, details, graphs and charts on employees’ security 
behavioural patterns and profiles. View security awareness education and training 
programmes scheduled by the system for each employee and conducts extensive training 
programmes or workshops with the help of outside security professionals. 
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Information Security Officer - Views summaries, details, graphs and charts on employees’ 
security behavioural patterns and profiles. Views separate views on employees’ security 
behaviour categorized under cyber activities monitored directly by the system, personal 
views inputted by their managers or security personnel, and background information 
inputted by the HR managers. Views security awareness education and training 
programmes scheduled by the system for each employee. Views emergency alerts in case 
of a security breach and takes immediate action based on the severity of the breach. 
Configures the security rules of the profiling system to be aligned with the business 
objectives of the organization.
3.2.3 Client-Server Architecture
This system employs a client-server architecture where the system hosted on a server 
provides different services to the different user classes discussed in the preceding section. 
The subsequent subsections examine the system features provided to these different user 
classes and their use cases. 
3.2.3.1 System Features 
User Log In
A user enters user ID and password and clicks “Log In” button 
 Log In Success:  
Saves user ID, date, and time in the audit log. Depending on the user’s 
designation, his or her user category is identified: 
Employee: Taken to the Mode Selection page. 
Manager: Taken to the Manager’s Tasks page allowing the choice of the 
Input Personal View page or the Input / Update Job Details page. 
Security Personnel: Taken to the Input Personal View page. 
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Human Resource Manager: Taken to the HR Manager’s Tasks page 
allowing the choice of the Add New Employee page or the 
Input / Update Background Information page. 
Security Manager: Taken to the Request Behavioural Profiles page. 
Information Security Officer: Taken to the ISO’s Tasks Page allowing the 
choice of the Request Behavioural Profiles page or the 
Configure Security Rules page. 
 Log In Fail: 
Saves IP address, date, and time in the audit log. User is returned to the Log In 
page. If the third attempt at Log In fails, the IP address is blocked and the ISO 
and security managers are immediately notified. 
Figure 3.2 depicts the log-in activity of the system. 
Figure 3.2 – Activity Diagram for Log­In 
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Mode Selection
The default mode is the Strict mode. If an employee selects the Relaxed mode and clicks the 
“OK” button 
Saves employee ID, date and time in the audit log and the employee is taken to 
relaxed mode. The employee’s personal browsing is enabled, while access to 
organization’s information database is denied. 
If user selects Strict mode and clicks “OK” button 
Saves employee ID, date, and time in the audit log. The time spent on the Relaxed 
mode is calculated and stored in the system database. Personal browsing is 
disabled, while access to the organization’s information is granted according to 
the employee’s security clearance level and Need-to-Know. 
Pop-up Security Awareness Reminders and Visual Aids
Security awareness reminders or visual aids such as presentations pop­up in the employee’s 
computer monitor at randomly scheduled instances or when the user is identified by the 
system to be potentially problematic to the organization’s security. The employee can return 
to work once the reminders or presentations followed by a question and answer (Q&A) 
session are successfully completed. 
Input Personal Views
A manager or security personnel selects an employee working under him or her, or in the 
division he or she is working in, from the drop down box and clicks “Input Personal View” 
button
The manager or security personnel is taken to the page to input their personal 
views on the employee’s behaviour. Once the manager or security personnel 
types in his or her personal view on the employee’s non­cyber behaviour and 
clicks the “OK” button, the personal views are saved in the system database. 
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Input or Update Job Details
When an employee is promoted, selected for a new project or removed from his or her 
current project, his or her manager selects that employee from the drop down box and clicks 
“Input / Update Job Details” button 
The manager is taken to the page to input or update employee’s job title, job 
description and need-to-know. The manager modifies the current field(s) and 
clicks the “Update” button(s) and the updated values are saved in the system 
database.
Input or Update Employee Background Information
When a background check is conducted on an employee, a human resource manager selects 
the employee from a drop down box and clicks “Input / Update Background Information” 
button
The HR manager is taken to the page to update employee’s address, telephone 
number, marital status, dependants, academic record, financial record and 
criminal record. The modified information is saved in the system database when 
the “Update” button is clicked. 
Add New Employee
If a new employee is recruited, a human resource manager clicks “Add New Employee” 
button
The HR manager is taken to the page to add a new employee’s name, employee 
ID, date of birth, national identification number, address, designation / title, date 
of recruitment and clearance level. When the “Save” button is clicked, this 
information is saved to the system database. 
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Request and View Behavioural Profiles and Security Education and Training Schedules
A security manager or the ISO selects an employee from a drop down box and clicks 
“Request Behavioural Profiles” button 
A summary of the behavioural patterns and the profile of the selected employee is 
displayed.
A security manager or ISO clicks “Details” button 
A page containing the detailed behavioural profile is displayed. 
A security manager or ISO clicks “Graphs” button 
A page containing graphs and charts displays the behavioural profile 
graphically.
A security manager or ISO clicks “Training Schedules” button 
A page depicting schedules of the security awareness training required by 
the employee graphically on a calendar is displayed. 
The ISO clicks “Separate Views” button 
A page separating cyber activities of the employee, personal views of their 
managers or security personnel on non-cyber activities, and background 
information, into different categories is displayed to allow the ISO to 
recognize personal biases against the employee.  
Emergency Alerts
When a security breach is detected, an emergency pop-up notification immediately alerts the 
ISO of this breach in real-time, allowing the ISO to take immediate action against the 
perpetrator and inform relevant authorities. 
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Configure Security Behavioural Rules
When the ISO clicks “Configure Security Rules” button 
A page containing a table allowing the ISO to configure security behavioural 
rules to be aligned with the specific requirements of the organization is displayed. 
Once the ISO makes the necessary configurations and clicks the “Save” button, 
the new configurations are saved to the rule configuration database to be used for 
security behavioural profiling. 
3.2.3.2 Use Cases
The basic use cases of this system are described in this section. Figure 3.3 and table 3.1 
describe the use case for personal observations, while figure 3.4 and table 3.2 describe the use 
case for action on system output. 
Figure 3.3 – Use Case Diagram for Personal Observations 
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Table 3.1 – Use Case for Personal Observations 
ID Personal Observations 
Description 
Managers and security personnel observe employees’ non­cyber activity and input their 
observations to the system. Managers also input or update employees’ titles, job 
descriptions and Need-to-Know according to the project(s) the employees are currently 
working on. Human resource managers input information of background checks carried out 
on new recruits and update information about current employees after periodic background 
checks.
Actors Managers, security personnel, human resource managers and employees 
Preconditions 
Employee must be assigned a project to update job specification and Need-to-Know. 
Employee must be promoted in rank to update title. 
Basic Steps 
Personal observations by managers and security personnel are recorded in the system 
database. Background information is recorded in the system database.  
Alternate Steps None 
Exceptions None 
Basic validation / 
Rules 
Authentication of managers, security personnel and human resource managers will be 
validated by the system before they are allowed to log in to the system to perform the 
relevant inputs or updates. 
Postconditions None 
Figure 3.4 – Use Case Diagram for Action on System Output 
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Table 3.2 – Use Case for Action on System Output 
ID Action on System Output 
Description 
Security managers and external security professionals conduct security awareness 
education and training programmes as required. Information security officer takes 
immediate action in the case of an emergency. 
Actors 
Security managers, security professionals, information security officer, employees and 
authorities (police, CIA, federal officers etc.) 
Preconditions 
Employees’ cyber activity, non­cyber activity, and background information must be 
available in the system to compile their security behavioural profiles. 
Basic Steps 
Security managers obtain output of the system including employees’ behavioural profiles 
and schedules for security training / education and conduct these programmes with outside 
security professionals.  
Alternate Steps 
If no training programmes are necessary, the system will provide awareness through 
automatic pop-up reminders and visual aids. 
Exceptions 
If an emergency situation is detected, the system alerts the information security officer, 
who acts immediately to mitigate the problem. 
Basic validation / 
Rules 
Authentication of security managers and the information security officer will be validated 
by the system before they are allowed to log in to the system to perform information 
retrievals. 
Postconditions None 
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Chapter 4 
Proof of Concept 
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Chapter 4 
Proof of Concept 
4.1 Introduction
In order to prove the feasibility of the proposed concept, certain components of this system 
were implemented during this research. This chapter discusses the design, development and 
testing of this implemented profiling system. 
4.2 System Design
This section discusses the design of this profiling system in detail. 
4.2.1 System Database Structure
This system contains two separate databases: one for storing user information and employee 
behavioural characteristics, and another for configuring security rules of the system, thus 
allowing these rules to be configured by the ISO to be aligned with the organization’s 
business objectives. The following subsections provide the structure of these databases. 
4.2.1.1 Information Security Behavioural Database
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 depict the Entity-Relationship (ER) diagram of the information security 
behavioural database, and the database schema diagram, respectively. 
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Figure 4.1 – ER Diagram of the Information Security Behavioural Database 
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Figure 4.2 – Schema of the Information Security Behavioural Database 
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4.2.1.2 Information Security Rule Configuration Database
The ER diagram of the security rule configuration database is depicted in figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3 – ER Diagram of the Information Security Rule Configuration Database 
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4.2.2 System Design Diagrams
The activity, sequence, and class diagrams developed during the design phase of this research 
are examined in this section. 
4.2.2.1 Activity Diagrams
The activity diagrams for the user classes of “Employee”, “HR Manager”, “Manager”, 
“Security Personnel”, “Security Manager” and “Information Security Officer” are depicted in 
figures 4.4 through 4.9. Figure 4.4 shows how the “Employee” user class may go about their 
‘strict mode’ or ‘relaxed mode’ tasks.  
Employee
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Date, Time,
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Date, Time,
Mode
Disable
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Browsing
Enable
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OKChange Mode Log Out
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Figure 4.4 – Activity Diagram for the “Employee” User Class 
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Figure 4.5 – Activity Diagram for the “HR Manager” User Class 
Figure 4.6 – Activity Diagram for the “Manager” User Class 
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Figure 4.7 – Activity Diagram for the “Security Personnel” User Class 
Figure 4.8 – Activity Diagram for the “Security Manager” User Class 
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Figure 4.9 – Activity Diagram for the “Information Security Officer” User Class 
Figure 4.5 depicts how a human resource manager can add a new employee, or input / update 
background information, while figure 4.6 shows how a manager may input personal views on 
an employee’s non­cyber activity, or input / update their job descriptions. Figure, 4.7 shows 
how a security personnel may input their personal views on employees’ non­cyber activities, 
while figure 4.8 shows how a security manager may view summarized, detailed or graphical 
behavioural profiles and employees’ security education and training schedules. Finally, figure 
4.9 shows how the information security officer can view summarized, detailed, graphical or 
separate views of behavioural profiles and employees’ security education and training 
schedules, or configure security behavioural rules. 
4.2.2.2 Sequence Diagrams
The sequence diagrams for data access behaviour, password security behaviour, data backup 
behaviour, data sanitization behaviour, and security behaviour concerning external storage 
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devices are depicted in figures 4.10 through 4.14. The sequence diagram for viewing security 
behavioural profiles is depicted in figure 4.15. Figure 4.10 shows how an employee may 
access data within or below his / her security clearance level and for which they have a Need-
to-Know, or how if either condition fails, their profile will be updated with the unauthorized 
access attempt. Figure 4.11 depicts how profiles are updated with password strength, 
modifying frequency, reuse of former passwords, and mistyping of passwords, while figure 
4.12 shows updating profiles with data backup frequency and the following of backup 
naming conventions etc. Figures 4.13 and 4.14 depict the updating of profiles for data 
sanitization, scanning and validating external storage media, while figure 4.15 shows the 
process of requesting to view security behavioural profiles by the ISO / security managers.  
Figure 4.10 – Sequence Diagram for Data Access Behaviour 
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Figure 4.11 – Sequence Diagram for Password Security Behaviour 
Figure 4.12 – Sequence Diagram for Data Backup Behaviour 
Figure 4.13 – Sequence Diagram for Data Sanitization Behaviour 
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Figure 4.14 – Sequence Diagram for Security Behaviour concerning External Storage 
Devices 
Figure 4.15 – Sequence Diagram for Viewing Security Behavioural Profiles 
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4.2.2.3 Class Diagrams
The basic class diagram of the security behavioural profiling system is depicted in figure 4.16. 
Figure 4.16 – Class Diagram of the Security Behavioural Profiling System 
As can be seen through figure 4.16, the “Manager” user class has all the functionality a 
“Security Personnel” user class possesses concerning inputting personal views on non-cyber 
behaviour of employees, in addition to the functionality of inputting / updating job 
descriptions. Similarly, the “ISO” user class possesses all the functionality the “Security 
Manager” user class has of viewing behavioural profiles in summarized, detailed and 
graphical views and viewing employees’ security education and training schedules, in 
addition to being able to view behavioural profile components separately, receive emergency 
alerts concerning extremely problematic behaviour, as well as being able to configure the 
security behavioural rules to be aligned with the business objectives of the organization.
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4.3 System Development
This section discusses the aspects of implementation of the security behavioural profiling 
system. Both the front-end and the back-end of the system were developed on NetBeans 
Integrated Development Environment (IDE) 7.4 platform, using Java Development Kit 
(jdk1.7.0).
4.3.1 Database Development
The databases of the behavioural profiling system (both the information security behavioural 
database and the security rule configuration database) were developed on pgAdmin III 
v1.14.3 using PostGreSQL and java database connectivity (JDBC).
4.3.2 Front-End Development
The development of the graphical user interfaces (GUIs) of the front-end of the system are 
discussed in the subsequent subsections. In addition to the basic components of jdk1.7.0, the 
front-end development of this system also required the use of jfreechart-1.0.16 and jcalendar 
components. 
4.3.2.1 Graphical User Interfaces for “Employee”
The GUIs depicting employees’ tasks, employees’ strict mode tasks, changing password and 
accessing data are depicted in figures 4.17 through 4.20. 
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Figure 4.17 – Employees’ Tasks GUI 
Figure 4.18 – Employees’ Strict Mode Tasks GUI 
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Figure 4.19 – GUI for Changing Password 
Figure 4.20 – GUI for Accessing Data 
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4.3.2.2 Graphical User Interfaces for “Human Resource Manager”
The GUI depicting HR managers’ tasks, the GUI for adding a new employee, the GUI for 
selecting an employee for updating background information, and the GUI for inputting or 
updating employee’s background information, respectively, are depicted in figures 4.21 
through 4.24. 
Figure 4.21 – HR Managers’ Tasks GUI 
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Figure 4.22 – GUI for Adding a New Employee 
Figure 4.23 – GUI for Selecting an Employee to Update Background Information 
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Figure 4.24 – GUI for Inputting / Updating Employee Background Information 
4.3.2.3 Graphical User Interfaces for “Manager”
The GUI depicting Managers’ tasks, the GUI for selecting an employee to update job details, 
and the GUI for updating employee job details are depicted in figures 4.25 though 4.27. The 
GUIs for allowing managers to select an employee to input his personal view about the 
employee’s security behaviour, and for inputting his personal view, are similar to the GUIs 
allowing the security personnel to do the same, and thus, are discussed under activities of 
security personnel. 
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Figure 4.25 – Managers’ Tasks GUI 
Figure 4.26 – GUI for Selecting Employee to Update Job Details 
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Figure 4.27 – GUI for Inputting / Updating Employee Job Details 
4.3.2.4 Graphical User Interfaces for “Security Personnel”
The GUIs allowing a security personnel to select an employee to input his personal view 
about the employee’s security behaviour, and for inputting his personal view, are depicted 
through figures 4.28 and 4.29, respectively. 
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Figure 4.28 – GUI for Selecting Employee to Input Personal Views of Security Behaviour 
Figure 4.29 – GUI for Inputting Personal Views on Employee’s Security Behaviour 
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4.3.2.5 Graphical User Interfaces for “Security Manager” 
The GUIs allowing a security manager to request security behavioural profiles and view the 
summarized profile are depicted in figures 4.30 and 4.31, respectively. The GUIs allowing 
security managers to view detailed and graphical profiles, and to view security training 
schedules are similar to the GUIs allowing the ISO to do the same, and thus are discussed 
under activities of the ISO. 
Figure 4.30 – GUI for Requesting Security Behavioural Profiles 
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Figure 4.31 – GUI for Viewing a Summarized Profile by a Security Manager 
4.3.2.6 Graphical User Interfaces for “Information Security Officer”
The GUI depicting the ISO’s tasks is shown in figure 4.32. The GUIs allowing the ISO to 
view security behavioural profiles in summarized, detailed, and graphical form, and as 
separate views are depicted in figures 4.33 through 4.36, respectively, while figure 4.37 
depicts the GUI for viewing security education and training schedules. The GUI depicting the 
requesting to view security profiles by the ISO is similar to that allowing the security 
managers to do the same as discussed in the previous subsection. Figure 4.38 depicts the GUI 
for configuring security rules. 
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Figure 4.32 – ISO’s Tasks GUI 
Figure 4.33 – GUI for Viewing a Summarized Profile by the ISO 
68 
Figure 4.34 – GUI for Viewing a Detailed Profile by the ISO 
Figure 4.35 – GUI for Viewing a Graphical Profile by the ISO 
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Figure 4.36 – GUI for Viewing a Profile as Separate Views by the ISO 
Figure 4.37 – GUI for Viewing a Security Education and Training Schedule
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Figure 4.38 – GUI for Configuring Security Behavioural Rules
4.3.3 Back-End Development
Since programs to detect various aspects of data sanitization behaviour and network security 
behaviour are currently available, this system implementation focuses mainly on the 
monitoring of password security behaviour, data backup behaviour, and physical security 
behaviour. The following aspects of this system were implemented and tested through this 
research: 
Strict mode
Password Security Behaviour: password strength (an existing common algorithm was 
reused), password modifying frequency, password reuse 
Data Access and Backup Behaviour: data backup frequency, attempts to access data over 
clearance, attempts to access data without need to know 
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Personal observations: forgetting keycards or Personal Identification Numbers (PINs), 
leaving items unattended, sociability, ambitiousness, writing passwords down, lending 
keycards or PINs, security consciousness, understanding and valuing ISM rules 
Information obtained through background checks: marital status, number of dependents, 
academic record, financial status record, criminal record 
Configuration of security behavioural rules
Creation of user security behavioural profiles: displayed in summarized, detailed, and 
graphical versions, and as separate views
Scheduling security awareness, education and training
The architecture of the developed system is depicted in figure 4.39. Each of these areas will 
be examined in detail in the rest of this section. 
Figure 4.39 – Architecture of the Developed Profiling System  
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4.3.3.1 Password Security Behaviour
Password Modifying Frequency: The system counts the number of password modifications 
since joining the organization and during the past 1 year. If the numbers are the same, then 
the employee might have joined less than a year ago, thus the system checks the number of 
password modifications in the past 10 months, 8 months and so on until the past month. If the 
employee joined less than a month ago, it is too new to determine their password 
modification frequency. If not, the system checks if the password is modified infrequently, 
few times a year, monthly, every two weeks, weekly, or excessively. If password 
modification has not been frequent, but has suddenly picked up pace, then it is determined to 
be a recent activity. Listed in Table 4.1 are the algorithms used for determining password 
modifying frequency. The functions for 10 months, 8 months, 6 months, 4 months, and 2 
months are omitted for brevity. The complete algorithm is listed under Appendix B. 
Password Reuse: The system counts the number of total passwords used by the employee in 
the past 1 year, the number of passwords reused once or twice, the number of passwords 
reused three-to-five times, the number of passwords reused six-to-nine times, and the number 
of passwords reused ten times or more in the past year to determine the employee’s 
inclination to reuse passwords. The algorithm for calculating password reuse is listed in 
Appendix B. 
Password Strength: An existing common algorithm, which considers the use of upper- and 
lower-case letters, numbers and other non-alphanumeric symbols, was reused to check 
password strength. The algorithm is listed in Appendix B. 
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Table 4.1 – Algorithm for Determining Password Modifying Frequency
Algorithm 
Start
 modFreq (modifying frequency), yearly count = count pw changes within last 1 year 
 total pw = count all password changes since joining organization 
  if (total pw <= yearly count)                                      //joined less than 1 year ago 
   ten month count = count pw changes within last 10 months 
   if (total pw <= ten month count)                                                          /joined less than 10 months ago 
    eight month count = count pw changes within last 8 months 
    …… 
                                if (total pw <= monthly count)                                                  //joined less than 1 month ago 
             modFreq = “Too new to determine” 
             else 
             if(monthly count > 1) 
             modFreq = do 1month
            else if(monthly count == 1) 
             modFreq = “Monthly” 
            else                                                                 //monthly count < 1 
            modFreq = “Infrequent” 
                       …… 
   else 
    if( ten month count > 3) 
     modFreq = do 10months
    else if(ten month count == 3) 
     modFreq = “Few times yearly” 
    else                                                                //ten month count < 3 
     modFreq = “Infrequent” 
  else 
   if( yearly count > 4) 
    modFreq = do 1year
   else if(yearly count == 4) 
    modFreq = “Few times yearly” 
   else                                                                        //yearly count < 4 
    modFreq = “Infrequent” 
 Return modFreq 
Stop
1 year: Start 
 modFreq 
 yearly count = count pw changes within last 1 year 
  if (yearly count <10) 
   modFreq = “Few times yearly” 
                else                                                                                          //more than 10 times in the past 1 year 
   ten month count = count pw changes within last 10 months 
   if (ten month count < yearly count) 
    modFreq = do 10months
   else 
    modFreq = “Recent activity” 
 Return modFreq 
Stop
1month: Start 
 modFreq 
 Read monthly count 
  If (monthly count < 2) 
   modFreq = “Monthly” 
  else                                                                                                              //more than once a month 
   two week count = count pw changes within last 14 days 
   if (two week count < monthly count) 
    modFreq = do 2weeks
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Algorithm 
   else 
    modFreq = “Recent activity” 
 Return modFreq 
Stop
Two weeks: Start 
 modFreq 
 Read two week count 
  If (two week count <2) 
  modFreq = “Every 2 weeks” 
  else                                                                                                    //more than once every 2 weeks 
   weekly count = count pw changes within last 7 days  
   if (weekly count < two week count) 
    if (weekly count < 2) 
     modFreq = “Weekly” 
    else                                                                                            //more than once a week 
     modFreq = “Excessively   
   else                                                                     //weekly count is the same as two week count 
    modFreq = “Recent activity” 
 Return modFreq 
Stop
4.3.3.2 Data Access & Backup Behaviour
Unauthorized Data Access: The system checks for unauthorized access or attempts to backup 
data the user is not authorized to access. Data and user security clearance levels are classified 
into five stages based on their criticality / job titles. For this system implementation, these 
levels are assumed to be “Public”, “Unclassified”, “Classified”, “Secret”, and “Top Secret” 
from the lowest to the highest. Since the system uses a “No Read­Up” rule, if an employee 
attempts to access or backup data of a higher classification than his / her security clearance 
level, or data for which they have no Need-to-Know, their action is blocked and their profile 
is updated with the unauthorized access attempt. Access is only granted if data is on the same 
level or below their clearance level and if they possess the Need-to-Know that information. 
The algorithms for unauthorized data access and attempted backing up of unauthorized data 
are listed in Appendix B. 
Data Backup Frequency: The system computes the data backup frequency by counting the 
number of total backups performed by the employee since joining the organization and the 
number of backups performed in the past month. If these two numbers are the same, then the 
employee might have joined the organization less than a month ago and it is thus too new to 
determine their backup frequency. If the employee joined earlier, however, then the system 
determines if the backup frequency is infrequent, weekly, daily, or excessive. If the employee 
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used to perform backups at a slower pace, but has recently started backing up more frequently, 
then the system determines the backup frequency to be a recent activity.  The algorithm to 
compute backup frequency is listed in Appendix B.  
4.3.3.3 Behavioural Profiling
The system adapts a rule-based inference system to compile a user security behavioural 
profile containing the relevant behavioural characteristics for each observable behavioural 
pattern concerning personally observed non-cyber activities, automatically monitored cyber 
activities, and background information, by checking the current profile for its characteristics 
and adding the new characteristics if they are not already listed. The behavioural 
characteristics shown in Table 4.2 are assumed for each of the following observable 
behavioural patterns when creating the user security behavioural profiles. The system allows 
these rules to be configured by the ISO to be aligned with the organization’s business 
objectives. The default values listed in Table 4.2 can serve as general guidelines. “N” depicts 
not having the corresponding characteristic, while “Y” depicts having that characteristic. The 
characteristics not relevant to a corresponding observable behaviour are coloured in grey. 
Thus, according to the default values, the security behavioural profile for an employee who 
leaves items unattended, for example, will contain the characteristics of not being security 
conscious, easily revealing information, not valuing or understanding ISM rules, and having a 
potential for improper sharing of information. The algorithm for compiling security 
behavioural profiles is listed in Appendix B in summarized form. 
76 
Table 4.2 – Behavioural Characteristics for Observable Behavioural Patterns 
Activity 
Personally Observed Non-Cyber Activities 
Forgets keys N - - - - - - - - - - - - Y - 
Does not forget keys Y - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Leaves items unattended N Y N - - - - - - - - - - Y - 
Does not leave items Y N - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Sociable - - - Y - - - - - - - - - - - 
Not sociable - - - N - - - - Y - - - - - - 
Ambitious - - - - Y - - - - Y - - - - Y 
Not ambitious - - - - N - - - - - - - - - - 
Writes down passwords N Y - - - - - - - - - - - Y - 
Does not write passwords Y - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Lends keys/PINs - Y - - - - - - Y - - - - Y - 
Does not lend keys/PINs - N - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Security conscious Y - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Not security conscious N - - - - - - - - - - - - Y - 
Understands/values rules - - Y - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Doesn’t understand /value  ­ ­ N ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ ­ Y ­ 
Background Information – Marital Status, Dependents, Academic Record, Financial Status, Criminal Record 
Married  - - - - - Y - 
Unmarried  Y - - - - - - 
Divorced  - - Y - - - - 
Widowed  - - - - - - - 
Dependents  Y  2 
BS/MS in Computers  Y  Y 
No BA/BS/MS  Y 
Low income  Y 
Has criminal record  Y  Y 
Cyber Activities – Password Strength 
Very weak - - - - - - Y - - - - - - - - 
Weak - - - - - - Y - - - - - - - - 
Medium  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Strong Y - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Cyber Activities – Password Modification Frequency 
Infrequent N - N - - - Y - - - - - - Y - 
Few times a year N - N - - - Y - - - - - - Y - 
Monthly - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Every 2 weeks - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Weekly - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Excessively - - - - - - - Y - - - - - - Y 
Recent activity - - - - - - - Y - - - - - - Y 
Cyber Activities – Password Reuse 
Ten times or over N - N - - - Y - - - - - - Y - 0 
Six-to-nine times N - N - - - Y - - - - - - Y - 0 
Three-to-five times N - N - - - Y - - - - - - Y - 1 
Cyber Activities – Attempts to Access Data without Authorization 
Over clearance - - N - - - - Y - - - - - - Y 0 
No need-to-know - - N - - - - Y - - - - - - Y 0 
Cyber Activities – Backup Frequency 
Infrequent N - N - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Weekly - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Daily - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Excessively - - - - Y - - Y - - - - - Y - 
Recent activity - - - - - - - Y - - - - - Y - 
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Asides from the obvious, the reasoning behind this default configuration of security 
behavioural rules is explained below. Of these, the points concerning marital status are 
somewhat sensitive topics, thus it is important that these security rules are allowed to be 
configured to be aligned with the specifications of the organization. For instance, an 
organization which does not allow the spouse of an employee to be employed at the same 
organization might hold a firm stance concerning these points, whereas, an organization 
which is more lenient towards such issues may tend to be more relaxed concerning such 
points:
Low sociability: leads to social incentives to engage in inappropriate behaviour 
pertaining to information security (AAAS, 1990), (Lacey, 2009), (Schneier, 2008) 
High ambitiousness: leads to career-wise incentives to engage in inappropriate behaviour 
pertaining to information security, and potential to access unauthorized information 
(AAAS, 1990), (Fernando & Asai, 2011b), (Lacey, 2009) 
Not understanding / valuing ISM rules: leads to potential for improper information 
sharing (Asai & Fernando, 2011a), (Asai & Fernando, 2011b), (Asai, Fernando & 
Castillo, 2011), (Fernando & Asai, 2011a), (Fernando & Asai, 2011b),   (Insight Express, 
2008), (ISO/IEC 270001, 2005), (Lacey, 2009), (Thapar, 2007) 
Being married: leads to potential for improper information sharing (AAAS, 1990), 
(Harris & Patten, 2011), (Schneier, 2008) 
Being unmarried: leads to social incentives to engage in inappropriate behaviour 
pertaining to information security (Harris & Patten, 2011) 
Weak password strength, low password modifying frequency, high reuse of former 
passwords: leads to potential for improper information sharing (Bishop, 2003), (ISO/IEC 
270001, 2005), (Lacey, 2009), (Thapar, 2007) 
Excessive or high recent activity of password modification / data backup: leads to 
suspicious behaviour (Foley, 2011), (Mills, 2011), (Vroom & von Solms, 2003) 
Figure 4.40 displays the number of instances of security behavioural characteristics tested by 
the default configuration of security rules of this system for each of the observable 
behavioural patterns.
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Figure 4.40 – Security Behavioural Characteristics Tested by the Profiling System 
As can be seen, corroborating previous researches including (Asai & Fernando, 2011a), (Asai 
& Fernando, 2011b), (Asai, Fernando & Castillo, 2011), (Fernando & Asai, 2011a), (Fernando 
& Asai, 2011b), and (Insight Express, 2008), improper information sharing potential has the 
highest magnitude, followed by equal magnitudes of not being security conscious, and not 
valuing or understanding ISM rules, in second place. 
4.3.3.4 Scheduling Security Education & Training
The system reads the database to check for any existing security training schedules. If so, the 
system checks if any of those schedules are yet to come. If there are no available schedules, 
or if all the available schedules are in the past, then the system re-computes the new 
schedules. The random schedule for periodic risk perception renewal is set in 4 weeks from 
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the coming Tuesday for all employees. This will likely consist of a pop-up presentation about 
security best practices followed by a questioning session to check the employee’s 
understanding of security awareness. For employees who have a potential for improper 
information sharing, a hands-on security workshop conducted by external security 
professionals is scheduled in 2 weeks from the coming Wednesday. If an employee has the 
potential for unauthorized access to information, the system schedules a security seminar by 
security managers and legal officials in 1 week from the coming Wednesday. For employees 
who are deemed to have a motive for engaging in improper information sharing or 
unauthorized access, the system schedules closer inspection and background checks in 2 
weeks from the coming Thursday. Thus, the training schedules computed on 30th September 
2013 for an employee who requires all four types of security training will include a random 
awareness training on Tuesday, 29th October 2013, a security workshop on Wednesday, 16th
October 2013, a security seminar on Wednesday, 9th October 2013, and a security inspection 
on Thursday, 17th October 2013. The algorithms for computing security training schedules 
are listed in Appendix B. 
4.4 System Testing
During the system testing phase, each individual component was first checked for accuracy 
before being integrated together, and subjected to system testing as a whole. In order to 
conduct these tests, ten hypothetical test case scenarios were created. These hypothetical test 
cases are described in the subsequent subsection, while the following subsection discusses the 
test results. 
4.4.1 Hypothetical Test Cases 
Table 4.3 lists the background information and the job description of the ten hypothetical test 
cases created to test this system, while table 4.4 lists the hypothetical personal views about 
the non-cyber activities of these employees observed and inputted by managers and security 
personnel.
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Table 4.3 – Hypothetical Employees 
Emp0001 Martha Hall Accountant Unmarried 0 BA – Accounting    
Steady
income None 
Emp0002 Monica White 
Software 
Engineer Married 1 
BS – Computer 
Science 
Steady
income None 
Emp0003 Shaun Mills Computer Operator Divorced 1 
Computer Tech 
Certification 
Low
income 
Juvenile breaking 
and entering 
Emp0004 John Flynn Software Engineer Widowed 2 
MS – Computer 
Engineering 
Steady
income 
Teenaged 
hacking into 
Federal Database 
Emp0005 Jacob Call Computer Operator Married 3 
Computer Tech 
Certification 
Low
income None 
Emp0006 Faith Stellar Software Engineer Divorced 1 
MS – Computer 
Engineering 
Steady
income None 
Emp0007 ClaireMcCormick Accountant Unmarried 0 
BA – 
Accounting  
Steady
income None 
Emp0008 Samantha Colt 
Computer 
Operator Unmarried 1 
Computer Tech 
Certification 
Low
income 
Juvenile 
shoplifting 
Emp0009 Gavin Fields Accountant Divorced 3 BA – Accounting 
Steady
income None 
Emp0010 Sarah Mason Software Engineer Married 2 
MS – Computer 
Engineering 
Steady
income None 
Table 4.4 – Personal Views on Non-Cyber Activity 
ID Manager’s View Security Personnel’s View 
Emp0001 Forgets keycards Leaves items unattended 
Emp0002 Sociable, ambitious  
Emp0003 Writes down passwords, leaves item unattended Forgets keycards 
Emp0004 Security conscious, ambitious  
Emp0005 Sociable, lends keycards and PINs Forgets keycards 
Emp0006 
Security conscious, understands and values ISM rules, 
ambitious 
Emp0007 Lends keycards and PINs, does not value ISM rules  
Emp0008 
Lends keycards and PINs, does not understand or 
value ISM rules 
Lends keycards and PINs, writes down 
passwords 
Emp0009 Ambitious  
Emp0010   
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4.4.2 Test Results 
The individual components for computing password security behaviour and data backup 
behaviour were tested for their accuracy of computing cyber activity. Table 4.5 provides an 
example for computing password modifying frequency for employee Claire McCormick 
(Emp0007), who joined the organization on 2013/4/2. Password modification frequency is 
computed on the last date of modifying the password, which is 2013/9/23 for employee 
Claire McCormick. 
Table 4.5 – Password Changes by Employee Claire McCormick (Emp0007) 
Password Change ID Date Password Strength 
2013-04-02_emp0007_03:40:18 2013-04-02 4cMc7LrI Medium 
2013-04-26_emp0007_03:48:28 2013-04-26 LcM7cC01 Medium 
2012-05-31_emp0007_21:24:16 2012-05-31 RaI007lC Medium 
2013-06-28_emp0007_21:16:28 2013-06-28 LcM7cC01 Medium 
2013-07-19_emp0007_21:24:43 2013-07-19 cL7MM92c Medium 
2013-08-22_emp0007_19:25:26 2013-08-22 LcM7cC01 Medium 
2013-09-23_emp0007_01:41:07 2013-09-23 cCmC7k05 Medium 
Table 4.6 shows the resulting password security behaviour for Claire McCormick, which 
shows that she modifies her password “Monthly” and that out of a total of 7 passwords used, 
she had reused no passwords ten times or more, 0 passwords were reused six-to-nine times, 1 
password was reused three-to-five times and 4 passwords were used once or twice. 
Table 4.6 – Password Security Behaviour of Claire McCormick (Emp0007) 
Employee ID Password Strength Reuse Password Modifying Frequency 
Emp0007 Medium 7_0_0_1_4 Monthly 
Table 4.7 provides an example for computing backup frequency for employee Gavin Fields 
(Emp0009), who joined the organization on 2009/10/1. The data backing up of the last 6 
months by Gavin Fields is displayed. Backup frequency is computed on the last date of 
performing data backup, which is 2013/9/30 for employee Gavin Fields. Table 4.8 shows that 
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the resulting backup behaviour for Gavin Fields shows that his performing of data backup is 
computed to be of “Recent activity”, since he has been modifying it monthly up until 
2013/8/23, and since then, his backing up of data has picked up pace and he has been 
performing data backups more frequently; sometimes even multiple times a day. 
Table 4.7 – Data Backup by Employee Gavin Fields (Emp0009) 
Data Backup ID Employee ID Date 
2013-03-22_emp0009_20:18:23 Emp0009 2013-03-22 
2013-04-26_emp0009_21:55:46 Emp0009 2013-04-26 
2013-05-24_emp0009_21:58:47 Emp0009 2013-05-24 
2013-06-28_emp0009_19:55:30 Emp0009 2013-06-28 
2013-07-22_emp0009_21:55:53 Emp0009 2013-07-22 
2013-08-23_emp0009_21:55:34 Emp0009 2013-08-23 
2013-09-06_emp0009_21:55:56 Emp0009 2013-09-06 
2013-09-06_emp0009_21:55:57 Emp0009 2013-09-06 
2013-09-09_emp0009_17:36:48 Emp0009 2013-09-09 
2013-09-13_emp0009_21:55:59 Emp0009 2013-09-13 
2013-09-22_emp0009_20:56:01 Emp0009 2013-09-22 
2013-09-22_emp0009_20:56:02 Emp0009 2013-09-22 
2013-09-22_emp0009_21:56:03 Emp0009 2013-09-22 
2013-09-22_emp0009_22:02:56 Emp0009 2013-09-22 
2013-09-30_emp0009_13:06:20 Emp0009 2013-09-30 
2013-09-30_emp0009_13:06:22 Emp0009 2013-09-30 
2013-09-30_emp0009_14:05:25 Emp0009 2013-09-30 
2013-09-30_emp0009_14:05:30 Emp0009 2013-09-30 
2013-09-30_emp0009_16:08:34 Emp0009 2013-09-30 
2013-09-30_emp0009_16:53:09 Emp0009 2013-09-30 
Table 4.8 – Backup Behaviour of Gavin Fields (Emp0009) 
Employee ID Backup Frequency 
Emp0009 Recent activity 
The results of these tests prove the accuracy of computing cyber activity by this implemented 
system. Table 4.9 shows the automatically monitored and computed cyber activity for all ten 
of these hypothetical employees.
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Table 4.9 – Computed Cyber Activity 
ID Password 
Strength
Password 
Reuse 
Password 
Modifying 
Frequency 
Backup 
Frequency 
Access
Over
Clearance 
Access
Without 
Need-to-Know
Emp0001 Medium 19_0_1_2_3 Every 2 weeks Daily 0 0 
Emp0002 Medium 12_0_0_2_5 Weekly Excessive 0 2 
Emp0003 Weak 20_0_1_2_2 Excessive Excessive 2 1 
Emp0004 Strong 13_0_0_0_12 Every 2 weeks Weekly 0 0 
Emp0005 Medium 3_0_0_0_3 Few times yearly Infrequent 1 0 
Emp0006 Strong 8_0_0_0_8 Monthly Daily 0 0 
Emp0007 Medium 7_0_0_1_4 Monthly Weekly 0 0 
Emp0008 Weak 2_0_0_0_2 Infrequent Infrequent 5 5 
Emp0009 Medium 18_0_0_3_2 Recent activity Recent activity 2 3 
Emp0010 Strong 3_0_0_0_3 Too new to 
determine 
Too new to 
determine 
0 1 
Table 4.10 depicts the MBTI personality types and resulting personalities of the employees as 
deemed true by the system according to the monitored cyber and non-cyber activities, and 
background information. The resulting personalities for each of the personality types listed in 
table 4.10 are adapted from the Myers & Briggs Foundation.  A “?” mark is used to depict an 
indeterminable dichotomy of personal preference, in which case the personality type and 
personality cannot be determined completely. 
Table 4.10 – Computed Personality Types and Personalities. 
ID Personality 
Type 
Personality
Emp0001 ?SF? Cannot determine personality 
Emp0002 IN?P Cannot determine personality 
Emp0003 ISFP Friendly, sensitive, likes own space and own time, loyal, committed, dislikes 
conflicts, enjoys present moment. 
Emp0004 INTP Seeks explanations, theoretical, not sociable, focused, analytical. 
Emp0005 ESFP Outgoing, friendly, accepting, loves material comforts, sociable, realistic, 
spontaneous. 
Emp0006 INTJ Develops perspectives, achieves goals, skeptical, has high performance standards. 
Emp0007 ESFP Outgoing, friendly, accepting, loves material comforts, sociable, realistic, 
spontaneous. 
Emp0008 ?SFP Cannot determine personality 
Emp0009 I??P Cannot determine personality 
Emp0010 INTP Seeks explanations, theoretical, not sociable, focused, analytical. 
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Table 4.11 depicts the results obtained from the security behavioural profiling system on 
2013/9/30. By comparing the data in table 4.10, concerning the personalities of the 
employees, with the resulting behavioural profiles in table 4.11, it can be seen that MBTI 
personality types and their resulting personalities match the behavioural profiles with 
sufficient accuracy. Thus, it is safe to assume that in the case the MBTI personality types of 
the employees of an organization are determined they could be used to provide insight into 
the behavioural patterns of the employees to a certain extent.  
These resulting profiles and security education and training schedules seen in table 4.11 show 
that employees, Monica White (Emp0002), Shaun Mills (Emp0003), Jacob Call (Emp0005), 
Samantha Colt (Emp0008) and Gavin Fields (Emp0009) have security behavioural flaws that 
could lead to information security problems along with motives or incentives, and thus need 
the hands-on training workshop, security educational seminar and closer inspection, along 
with the random security awareness. Employee Martha Hall (Emp0001), on the other hand 
requires the hands-on training workshop and closer inspection, along with the random 
security awareness program. Employees John Flynn (Emp0004) and Faith Stellar (Emp0006) 
do not engage in any wrongful security behaviour, but their knowledge about computers and 
their background information show that they still require the security seminar showing the 
legal aspects of security violations, along with closer inspection and the random security 
awareness. Employee Sarah Mason (Emp0009) is too new for the system to identify her 
security traits yet, but since she has already tried to access data without need-to-know once, 
and due to her background information, she requires the hands-on training workshop and 
security seminar, along with the random security awareness. Employee Claire McCormick 
(Emp0007), however, is an example of a case where the personal views of her manager might 
be biased. Her cyber activities and background information show that she does not engage in 
any wrongful security behaviour, but the personal views state otherwise. In this instance, the 
ISO can request for separate views of her security profile, and upon seeing that the personal 
observations by her manager contradict the rest of her security traits determined by the 
system, can use his or her own personal judgement to avoid any personal bias this employee’s 
manager might have towards her, and thereby decide whether she requires the hands-on 
training workshop, or whether closer inspection and the random security awareness program 
are sufficient.  
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Table 4.11 – Computed Security Behavioural Profiles, Security Status, and Security 
Education and Training Schedules 
ID Profile Security Status 
Not security conscious. Information revealed easily. 
Does not understand or value ISM rules. May have 
social incentives. Easy hack target. 
Has improper sharing 
potential. Has motives / 
incentives.
Sociable. Ambitious. May have career-wise 
incentives. Has technical knowledge about 
computers. Not security conscious. Does not 
understand or value ISM rules. Easy hack target. 
Suspicious behaviour. 
Has unauthorized access 
potential. Has improper 
sharing potential. Has 
motives / incentives. 
Not security conscious. Information revealed easily. 
Does not understand or value ISM rules. May have 
personal motives. May have social incentives. May 
have financial motives. May have psychological 
motives and potential. Suspicious behaviour. Easy 
hack target. Ambitious. 
Has unauthorized access 
potential. Has improper 
sharing potential. Has 
motives / incentives 
Ambitious. May have career-wise incentives. 
Security conscious. Has technical knowledge about 
computers. May have psychological motives and 
potential. 
Has unauthorized access 
potential. Has motives / 
incentives.
Sociable. Information revealed easily. May have 
social incentives. Not security conscious. May have 
financial motives. Does not understand or value 
ISM rules. Easy hack target. Suspicious behaviour. 
Has unauthorized access 
potential. Has improper 
sharing potential. Has 
motives / incentives. 
Ambitious. May have career-wise incentives. 
Security conscious. Understands and values ISM 
rules. May have personal motives. Has technical 
knowledge about computers. 
Has unauthorized access 
potential. Has motives / 
incentives.
Information revealed easily. May have social 
incentives. Does not understand or value ISM rules. 
Has improper sharing 
potential. Has motives / 
incentives.
Information revealed easily. May have social 
incentives. Does not understand or value ISM rules. 
Not security conscious. May have financial motives. 
May have psychological motives and potential. 
Easy hack target. Suspicious behaviour. 
Has unauthorized access 
potential. Has improper 
sharing potential. Has 
motives / incentives. 
Ambitious. May have career-wise incentives. May 
have personal motives. May have financial motives. 
Suspicious behaviour. Not security conscious. Does 
not understand or value ISM rules. Easy hack target. 
Has unauthorized access 
potential. Has improper 
sharing potential. Has 
motives / incentives. 
Has technical knowledge about computers. Security 
conscious. Does not understand or value ISM rules. 
Suspicious behaviour. 
Has unauthorized access 
potential. Has improper 
sharing potential. 
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These results prove that the anticipated outcomes of the hypothetical test cases were 
satisfactorily reflected through the security behavioural profiles compiled by this system. In 
order to ensure the accuracy of profiling security behaviour based on non-cyber activity and 
background information, the next section uses some real-life test case scenarios obtained 
from other researches (Okayasu, 2014) for profiling.  
4.4.3 Real-Life Test Cases & Test Results 
Table 4.12 – Real­Life Test Case Scenarios 
Case Background Information  Non-cyber Activity  Profile  Outcome  
IT genius, many academic 
accolades from MIT and 
Stanford. College dropout.  
Did not understand 
ISM rules 
(cybercrime, fraud, 
copyright violations). 
Has technical knowledge. May 
have social incentives. Does not 
understand or value ISM rules. 
Improper sharing potential.  
Hacked into digital 
library and released 
academic journals 
for free.  
Computer geek. Not 
sociable. Has gender identity 
disorder. Lowest rank in US 
military.  
Accessed information 
over clearance (during 
transportation). Does 
not understand or 
value ISM rules.  
Has technical knowledge. Not 
sociable. May have social 
incentives. Does not understand 
or value ISM rules. Has 
improper sharing potential. Has 
unauthorized access potential. 
Suspicious behavior.  
Released secret 
diplomatic and
military documents 
to Wikileaks.  
Gifted programmer and 
shrewd journalist. Won 
accolades for whistle-
blowing. Criminal record for 
hacking and rape and on 
Interpol criminal list. 
Divorced.   
Does not value ISM 
rules  makes his 
own rules and
justifications.  
Has technical knowledge. May 
have psychological motive and 
potential. May have social 
incentives. Does not understand 
or value ISM rules. Has 
improper sharing potential. Has 
unauthorized access potential. 
May have personal motives.  
Founded 
Wikileaks.  
Computer geek. High school 
dropout (General Education 
Development Diploma). 2-
year community college-
graduate. Discharged from 
military due to injury. 
Security personnel at NSA. 
IT operative at CIA.  
 Has technical knowledge. May 
have social incentives.  
Collected and
copied secret 
surveillance dossier
(without need-to-
know) and released 
the information.  
*Note: The background information, non-cyber activity, and outcomes of these real-life test 
cases were obtained from Okayasu (2014). 
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Example real-life test cases, the security behavioural profiles compiled by the system for 
these test cases, and the outcomes that occurred in these scenarios are listed in Table 4.12. 
The resulting security behavioural profiles of these real-life test case scenarios prove the 
accuracy of profiling, using non-cyber activity and background information, by this system. 
4.5 Engineering Challenges
The main engineering challenge faced by this research was during its evaluation phase, where 
it was not possible to evaluate the system for accuracy of computing cyber activity using real 
test data from real system users. Since the system requires gathering information about users’ 
behaviour over a period of time it cannot be evaluated using real test data unless it was 
deployed for beta-testing on a business organization with sufficient information assets.
The system was, however, tested for the accuracy of computing cyber activity, and for the 
accuracy of compiling security behavioural profiles based on computed cyber activity, non-
cyber activity, and background information of hypothetical test cases. In addition, the system 
implementation was also tested for the accuracy of compiling security behavioural profiles 
based on non-cyber activity and background information of real-life test cases. Further, the 
system was also evaluated for its usability and performance by real users during the 
evaluation phase of the research. The usability evaluation of this system is discussed in detail 
in the next chapter.  
4.6 Discussion 
The system presented through this research addresses the problem of improper sharing of 
information by insiders with outsiders or unauthorized insiders, and provides a workable 
solution to achieve internal control of information sharing within an organization. By 
examining the automatically monitored cyber activities of the employees, their non-cyber 
activities personally observed by their managers or security personnel of the organization, 
and their background information, the system compiles security behavioural profiles showing 
which of the employees could potentially engage in which wrongful activities that could 
present a threat to the organization’s information security. Accordingly, the system also 
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determines and schedules the level and type of security education and training to be given to 
each individual employee.  
By allowing observable information about employees’ non­cyber behaviour to be inputted 
personally by managers and security personnel, and through automatic monitoring of cyber-
activities of employees, this system attempts to handle the human-related problem of 
improper information sharing using both technological and social information gathering 
methods. It also provides a solution containing a socio-technological system employing 
automatic access control, logging, and risk perception renewals by the system, along with 
hands on security awareness and training workshops conducted by security professionals, and 
the allowing of the use of personal judgement by the ISO.  By providing a mix of social and 
technological methods and techniques, the system enables an organization to provide a 
workable managerial solution to this human-related problem of information security and 
thereby overcomes the weaknesses of a purely technological solution. 
Monitoring of employees’ activities does, however, produce privacy implications. This 
system keeps such implications to a minimal by providing the two separate “strict” and 
“relaxed” modes to clearly distinguish the times when monitoring of activities will or will not 
be conducted.
By allowing the ISO to configure the security behavioural rules to be aligned with the 
business objectives of the organization, this system can be tailor-made to suit the specific 
requirements of the organization. Further, the summarized, detailed, graphical and separate 
views of security behavioural profiles and the graphical display of security education and 
training schedules provide convenience to the ISO and security managers. 
The modules concerning the monitoring of employees’ password security behaviour, data 
access and backup behaviour, personal observations of employee behaviour, gathering 
information obtained through background checks, configuration of security behavioural rules, 
compilation of user security behavioural profiles and scheduling of security education and 
training were developed during the system implementation phase using a rule-based inference 
method.  
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Through the results obtained by testing the system presented above with the hypothetical test 
cases, it can be stated that this system can accurately compute employee cyber activity. 
Further, through the results obtained by testing the system implementation on both hypothetic 
and real-life test cases, it can be stated that the system can be used for accurately profiling 
and effectively predicting potential security infractions and information security behavioural 
flaws by employees within an organization to a certain extent. 
The next chapter discusses the usability evaluation of this system. 
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Chapter 5 
System Usability Evaluation 
5.1 Introduction
The system was evaluated for its usability and performance, and the evaluation process and 
its results are discussed in this chapter. 
The ten hypothetical test case scenarios used for the testing of this system and explained in 
section 4.4 were also used for the usability evaluation of this system. The usability evaluation 
of this system was carried out as explained below: 
The respondent pool of 24 was divided into three separate groups with 8 respondents each: 
group A, group B, and group C. The respondents of all groups were asked to assume they 
were the ISO of a business organization and to compile security behavioural profiles and 
security education and training schedules based on the information gathered by the security 
behavioural profiling system about the ten hypothetical employees as of 2013 September 30th.
Group A was given tabular data for each employee, instructions for computing cyber activity, 
compiling security behavioural profiles, and for determining and scheduling security 
education and training programmes. Group B was requested to use the developed system to 
obtain textual results compiled by the system. Group B was further given instructions for 
determining and scheduling security education and training programmes. Group C was 
requested to use the developed system to obtain graphical results compiled by the system. 
The data, instructions, and systems given to each of these three groups are summarized in 
table 5.1. The instructions given to each of these groups and the evaluation survey 
questionnaires, along with the tabular data provided to Group A, are listed under Appendix C.
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Table 5.1 – Usability Evaluation Groups 
Group A Group B Group C 
Tabular data of employees’ 
cyber activity 
Use implemented profiling system 
Use implemented profiling 
system 
Instructions to manually 
compute cyber activity: 
password modifying 
frequency, password reuse, 
data backup frequency, etc. 
View textual results: compiled profiles in 
summarized form, in detailed form, and in 
separate form (where behavioural 
characteristics pertaining to cyber activities, 
non-cyber activities, and background 
information, are viewed separately) 
View graphical results: 
compiled profiles in graphical 
form, computed security 
education and training 
schedules displayed graphically 
on a calendar 
Instructions and rules to 
manually compile security 
behavioural profiles 
Instructions to manually 
compute security education 
and training schedules 
Instructions to manually compute security 
education and training schedules 
Figure 5.1 depicts the summarized profile for employee Samantha Colt (Emp0008), while 
figures 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 display the detailed profile, separate views, graphical profile, and 
the graphical display of security education and training schedules on a calendar for the same 
employee.  The GUIs depicting the summarized, detailed, and graphical profiles, as well as 
the profiles as separate views, along with the security education and training schedules, for 
the rest of the hypothetical employees are listed under Appendix A. 
Figure 5.1 – Summarized Behavioural Profile of Samantha Colt (Emp0008) 
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Figure 5.2 – Detailed Behavioural Profile of Samantha Colt (Emp0008) 
Figure 5.3 – Separate Views of the Behavioural Profile of Samantha Colt (Emp0008) 
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Figure 5.4 – Graphical Behavioural Profile of Samantha Colt (Emp0008) 
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Figure 5.5 – Security Education and Training Schedules for Samantha Colt (Emp0008) 
The following aspects were evaluated: 
Speed of arriving at decisions concerning security behaviour 
Speed of scheduling security education and training 
Amount of computations needed for determining security behaviour 
Amount of computations needed for scheduling security education and training 
Presentation 
Amount of detail 
Usefulness of presented data 
Ease of determining potential or motive for improper information sharing or 
unauthorized data access 
Ease of recognizing personal bias 
Overall usability 
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The respondents were asked to rate each of these evaluation aspects on a scale of one to five 
ranging from “Very poor” through “Very good”. 
5.2 Respondent Characteristics
The respondents consisted of well-versed computer users of many nationalities and from 
many different occupations. The characteristics of the respondents belonging to each group 
and as a whole are depicted in tables 5.2 through 5.5. 
Table 5.2 – Respondent Characteristics of Group A 
Group A: Tabular data 8 
Nationality Occupation 
Sri Lankan 3 Graduate student 1 
American 1 Undergraduate 1 
Mexican 1 Professor 1 
Japanese 2 Teacher 1 
British 1 Software Architect 1 
Residing country Secretary 1 
Japan 3 Office worker 1 
Sri Lanka 3 Doctor 1 
United States 1     
United Kingdom 1     
Table 5.3 – Respondent Characteristics of Group B 
Group B: Textual profiles 8 
Nationality Residing country 
Sri Lankan 4 Japan 8 
Japanese 2 Occupation 
Venezuelan 1 Graduate student 8 
Nepalese 1     
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Table 5.4 – Respondent Characteristics of Group C 
Group C: Graphical profiles 8 
Nationality Residing country 
Sri Lankan 2 Japan 8 
Japanese 3 Occupation 
Mongolian 1 Graduate student 6 
Chinese 1 Undergraduate 2 
Indian 1     
Table 5.5 – Combined Respondent Characteristics 
Total 24 Residing country 
    Japan 19 
Nationality Sri Lanka 3 
Sri Lankan 9 United States 1 
American 1 United Kingdom 1 
Mexican 1 Occupation 
Japanese 7 Graduate student 15 
British 1 Undergraduate 3 
Venezuelan 1 Professor 1 
Nepalese 1 Teacher 1 
Mongolian 1 Software Architect 1 
Chinese 1 Secretary 1 
Indian 1 Office worker 1 
    Doctor 1 
5.3 Evaluation Results
The results of the system usability evaluation are presented in this section. The subsequent 
subsections examine the evaluation results of each of these separate groups, as well as the 
overall comparison of results across these three groups. Figure 5.6 depicts the evaluation 
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results for group A, while the evaluation results for groups B and C are depicted in figures 
5.7 and 5.8, respectively. 
5.3.1 Group A – Tabular Data 
Figure 5.6 – Evaluation Results for Group A – Using Tabular Data for Manually Computing 
Behavioural Profiles and Security Education and Training Schedules 
As can be seen through these evaluation results, the speed of arriving at decisions concerning 
security behaviour and the speed of scheduling security education and training for group A 
ranged from “Very slow” through “Moderate”, while the amount of computations for 
determining behaviour and for scheduling security education and training ranged from 
“Extensive” through “Moderate”. The presentation, amount of detail, and usefulness of data 
for group A spanned the entire range from “Very low” to “Very high”, while the ease of 
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determining potential or motive, recognizing personal bias, and overall usability of the 
system ranged from “Very low” through “High”. 
5.3.2 Group B – Textual Results 
Figure 5.7 – Evaluation Results for Group B – Using Textual Profiles Compiled by the 
Profiling System, and Manually Computing Security Education and Training Schedules 
The speed of arriving at decisions concerning behaviour ranged from “Slow” to “Very fast” 
for group B, while the speed of scheduling security education and training ranged only from 
“Slow” to “Fast”. This difference in speeds of arriving at decisions concerning behaviour and 
scheduling security education and training, is explained by the fact that group B had to 
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compute the security education and training schedules manually. The amount of computation 
needed by group B and the presentation of information to group B were mostly evaluated as 
being “Moderate”, while the amount of detail, usefulness of data, and the ease of determining 
potential or motive were deemed to be mostly “High”. The ease of recognizing personal bias 
ranged from “Moderate” to “Very high” for group B, while the overall usability of the system 
presented to group B was equally divided between “Moderate” and “High”. 
5.3.3 Group C – Graphical Results 
Figure 5.8 – Evaluation Results for Group C – Using Graphical Profiles and Security 
Education and Training Schedules Compiled by the Profiling System 
For group C, the speeds of arriving at decisions concerning behaviour and scheduling 
education and training were either “Fast” or “Very fast”, while the amount of computations 
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for determining behaviour ranged from “Large” to “Very small”, and the amount of 
computations for scheduling education and training ranged from “Moderate” to “Very small”. 
The presentation of the system, and the usefulness of the data, ranged from “Moderate” 
through “Very high” for group C. The amount of detail ranged from “Low” through “Very 
high”, while the ease of determining potential or motive was equally divided between “High” 
and “Very high”. The ease of recognizing bias, however, ranged only from “Low” to “High”. 
The overall usability of the system is deemed mostly as “Very high” for group C. 
Through these graphs it can be seen that there is a drift from “Very poor” to “Very good” 
from group A through C. To further explore this drift, the next subsection compares the 
results across these three groups. 
5.3.4 Overall Evaluation Results – Comparison across Groups 
Figures 5.9 through 5.18 depict the comparison of evaluation results across the three groups 
for each of the ten aspects of evaluation. 
Figure 5.9 – Comparison of Results for Speed of Arriving at Decisions concerning Security 
Behaviour
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Figure 5.10 – Comparison of Results for Speed of Scheduling Security Education and 
Training
From figure 5.9 it can be seen that the speed of arriving at decisions concerning security 
behaviour is moderate, slow or very slow when using tabular data, whereas it is mostly 
moderate, fast or very fast when using textual results, and mostly very fast when using 
graphical results. Figure 5.10 shows that the speed of scheduling security education and 
training is very slow through moderate when using tabular data, mostly moderate or fast 
when using textual results, and either fast or very fast when using graphical results. 
Figure 5.11 – Comparison of Results for Amount of Computations for Determining 
Behaviour
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Figure 5.12 – Comparison of Results for Amount of Computations for Scheduling Security 
Education and Training 
Figures 5.11 and 5.12 depict that the amounts of computations for determining behaviour and 
for scheduling security education and training are mostly large or extensive when using 
tabular data, whereas, they are mostly moderate when using textual results. When using 
graphical results, the amount of computations for determining behaviour range from very 
small through large, and the  amount of computations for scheduling security education and 
training range from very small through moderate. 
Figure 5.13 – Comparison of Results for Presentation 
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The presentation of data is mostly poor when using tabular data, mostly moderate when using 
textual results and is mostly high or very high when using graphical results. 
Figure 5.14 – Comparison of Results for Amount of Detail 
The amount of detail gleaned from tabular data is mostly high, while textual results provide 
mostly moderately detailed information, and graphical results provide mostly comprehensive 
or highly detailed information. 
Figure 5.15 – Comparison of Results for Usefulness of Presented Data 
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The usefulness of presented tabular data ranges from very low through very high, while 
textual results are mostly high and graphical results are mostly high or very high. 
Figure 5.16 – Comparison of Results for Ease of Determining Potential or Motive for 
Improper Information Sharing or Unauthorized Access 
When provided with tabular data, determining potential or motive for improper information 
sharing is mostly not easy, difficult, or very difficult, while it is mostly easy when provided 
with textual results, and either easy or very easy when presented as graphical results.
Figure 5.17 – Comparison of Results for Ease of Recognizing Personal Bias 
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Figure 5.17 shows that the ease of recognizing personal bias the managers or security 
personnel might have towards an employee ranges from easy through very difficult when 
provided with tabular data, while it ranges from not easy, easy, or very easy when provided 
with textual results, and ranges from easy through difficult when provided with graphical 
results only.  The fact that the separate views of automatically monitored, cyber-activity-
related data, personally inputted non-cyber-activity-related data, and background information, 
are only available as textual data explains why it is easier to recognize personal bias using 
textual results than when using graphical results. Even though the same data is also available 
in the tabular format, processing that data to glean the relevant information is more 
cumbersome than when presented as textual results already processed by system.  
Figure 5.18 – Comparison of Results for Overall Usability of the System
Figure 5.18 shows that the overall usability of tabular data is mostly low, while the overall 
usability of the system is either high or average when presented as textual results and mostly 
very high when presented as graphical results.
Figure 5.19 depicts the overall comparison of evaluation results across the three groups. The 
values for each aspect of evaluation in figure 5.19 were obtained by calculating the weighted 
mean where “Very poor” = 1 point, “Poor” = 2 points, “Moderate” = 3 points, “Good” = 4 
points, and “Very good” = 5 points. As seen through figure 5.19, computing security 
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behavioural profiles and security education and training schedules manually from tabular data 
had the lowest usability for each aspect of evaluation. The usability of the system with 
graphical displays was the highest for all aspects except for the ease of recognizing personal 
bias. The fact that group C could not view the separate components of cyber activity, non-
cyber activity, and background information, explains why the ease of recognizing personal 
bias for that group was lower than that of group B, which got to view the separate 
components. Even though tabular data provides the most extensive detail, the difficulty in 
processing the tabular data resulted in the amount of detail of group A (tabular data) being 
deemed lower than the amounts for groups B (textual results) and C (graphical results), which 
got to view already processed information in a clear, concise form.  
Figure 5.19 – Comparison of Evaluation Results across Groups 
These usability evaluation results show that the developed system certainly provides 
convenience to the ISO and security managers by profiling the security behaviour of 
109 
employees of the organization and scheduling security education and training for them. Thus, 
it also improves the ease and speed of making decisions by the ISO and security managers by 
presenting these security behavioural profiles and security education and training schedules 
in a well-organized, user-friendly manner. The fact that group C found it more difficult to 
recognize personal bias than did group B shows that while the graphical displays project the 
message in a fast, concise manner, the textual profiles provide further depth and insight into 
each behavioural characteristic or security infraction. Thus, the graphical results provided by 
the system should be used in conjunction with the textual results for optimum usability. 
5.4 Discussion
It can be seen that the profiling system presented through this research provides a convenient 
and workable solution to predicting information security behaviour of employees of an 
organization. By examining the automatically monitored cyber activities, personally observed 
non-cyber activities, and background information of the employees, the system compiles 
security behavioural profiles showing which of the employees could potentially engage in 
which security infractions. Accordingly, the system also determines and schedules the level 
and type of security education and training to be given to each individual employee. The 
system presents the behavioural profiles and security education and training schedules in a 
convenient, timely, and user-friendly fashion to enable faster decision-making by information 
security officers and security managers.  
Through the results of the usability evaluation of this system, it can be seen that this system 
provides considerable convenience and ease to the information security officers and security 
managers in making decisions concerning the security behaviour of the organization’s 
employees, the resulting information security problems, and the security training and 
education to be given to them. The system conveys the messages in a fast, concise manner 
through its graphical results, while providing more depth and insight into each security 
behavioural characteristic and security infraction through its textual results.
110 
111 
Chapter 6 
Summary
112 
Chapter 6 
Summary
6.1 Introduction
Human errors constitute the majority of identified information security breaches and most 
present-day attacks require a human element to be completed successfully and involve 
tricking people into revealing confidential information.  Most information security attacks 
originate from the inside with the involvement of trusted insiders. Even though, effective 
information security requires not only physical and technical controls, but also operational 
controls concerning the behaviour and actions of employees, most information security 
systems automatically assume employees’ adherence to policies instead of ensuring it. Thus, 
despite the overall understanding that the human factor should be taken into consideration in 
ISM, most security solutions available today still rely on purely technical measures to enforce 
information security. Yet, people may easily bypass technological controls and restrictions by 
revealing their authentication information to others. Although most technical security 
measures may be somewhat sufficient to keep outside attacks at bay, these alone are clearly 
insufficient to ward of insider attacks.
This research addresses the problem of improper sharing of information within an 
organization, by authorized insiders, with outsiders or unauthorized insiders, and presents a 
managerial solution blending social and technological methods and techniques together.
Human behaviour is performed according to the personality of the individual and can thus be 
categorized. The system presented in this paper adapts behavioural profiling, a technique 
somewhat similar to criminal profiling, by classifying behavioural patterns and predicting the 
next move. The system detects the level of observance of security best practices and 
behavioural patterns of employees in an organization by monitoring their cyber and non-
cyber activities, and uses this information in combination with their background information 
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and job details to create security behavioural profiles, in order to provide suggestions to the 
information security officer and security managers to help them identify users whose actions 
could potentially lead to information security infractions and ISM problems. Accordingly, the 
system also determines the level of security education and training required by each 
individual user and schedules these training programmes.  
6.2 Conclusions
In conclusion, it can be stated that the profiling system presented through this research 
provides a convenient and workable solution to achieve internal control of information 
sharing within an organization by profiling and thereby predicting information security 
behaviour of its employees.  
This system employs both social and technological information gathering methods by 
allowing observable information about employees’ non­cyber­activity-related behaviour to be 
inputted personally by managers and security personnel, and through the automatic 
monitoring of cyber activities. It also provides a managerial solution, which employs a 
mixture of technological and social methods and techniques to this human-related 
information security problem of improper information sharing by providing automatic access 
control, scheduling security education and training, etc., along with hands on security 
awareness and training workshops conducted by security professionals, and allowing the use 
of personal judgement by the ISO, etc., and thereby, overcoming the weaknesses of a purely 
technological solution.
Even though the monitoring of employees’ activities would normally produce privacy 
implications, this system keeps such implications to a minimal by providing the two separate 
“strict” and “relaxed” modes to clearly distinguish the times when monitoring of activities 
will or will not be conducted. 
Finally, by allowing the ISO to configure the security behavioural rules to be aligned with the 
business objectives of the organization, this system can be tailor-made to suit the specific 
requirements of the organization. 
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Through the results obtained by testing the system presented above with the hypothetical test 
cases, it can be stated that the implemented system accurately computes cyber activity. The 
resulting profiles of both hypothetical and real-life test cases prove that this system can be 
used for accurate profiling of security behaviour and effective prediction of security 
infractions and information security behavioural flaws by employees within an organization 
to a certain extent.
Through the results of the usability evaluation of this system, it can be stated that this system 
provides considerable convenience and ease to the information security officers and security 
managers in making decisions concerning the security behaviour of the organization’s 
employees and the security training and education to be given to them. The system conveys 
the messages in a fast, concise manner through its graphical results, while providing more 
depth and insight into each security behavioural characteristic and security infraction through 
its textual results.  
6.3 Future Work 
As future work, currently existing common algorithms could be reused with modifications 
and integrated to the implementation of this system to cover all the areas of monitoring of 
security behaviour proposed through this research.
In addition, the system could be deployed and put to use on real people in order to obtain real 
test results to further evaluate the system’s functionality. 
The profiling system could also be expanded to include features such as:  
Allowing the dynamic addition of new security rules by the information security officer to 
the rule base of the inference system 
Prioritizing security infractions / behavioural flaws 
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Observing employees’ security behaviour over a period of time and reporting the 
information security problems / security infractions which are most common or which are 
most likely to occur in the foreseeable future 
Group-wise viewing of security behavioural problems and  security education and training 
schedules
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Appendix B – Algorithms 
Table B.1 – Complete Algorithm for Determining Password Modifying Frequency
Algorithm
Start 
 modFreq 
 yearly count = count pw changes within last 1 year 
 total pw = count all pw changes since joining organization 
  if (total pw <= yearly count)                                                                                            //Joined less than 1 year ago 
   ten month count = count pw changes within last 10 months 
   if (total pw <= ten month count)                                                                     //Joined less than 10 months ago 
    eight month count = count pw changes within last 8 months 
    if (total pw <= eight month count)                                                       //Joined less than 8 months ago 
     six month count = count pw changes within last 6 months 
     if (total pw <= six month count)                                        //Joined less than 6 months ago 
      four month count = count pw changes within last 4 months 
      if (total pw <= four month count)                                       //Joined less than 4 months ago 
       two month count = count pw changes within last 2 months 
       if (total pw <= two month count)                               //Joined less than 2 months ago 
        monthly count = count pw changes within last 1 month 
        if (total pw <= monthly count)                           //Joined less than 1 month ago 
        modFreq = “Too new to determine” 
        else 
        if(monthly count > 1) 
         modFreq = do 1month
        else if(monthly count == 1) 
         modFreq = “Monthly” 
        else                                           //monthly count < 1 
         modFreq = “Infrequent” 
       else 
        if( two month count > 1) 
         modFreq = do 2months
        else if(two month count == 1) 
         modFreq = “Few times yearly” 
        else                                        //two month count < 1 
         modFreq = “Infrequent” 
      else 
       if( four month count > 2) 
        modFreq = do 4months
       else if(four month count == 2) 
        modFreq = “Few times yearly” 
       else                                        //four month count < 2 
        modFreq = “Infrequent” 
     else 
      if( six month count > 2) 
       modFreq = do 6months
      else if(six month count == 2) 
       modFreq = “Few times yearly” 
      else                                               //six month count < 2 
       modFreq = “Infrequent” 
    else 
     if( eight month count > 3) 
      modFreq = do 8months
     else if(eight month count == 3) 
      modFreq = “Few times yearly” 
     else                                        //eight month count  < 3 
      modFreq = “Infrequent” 
   else 
    if( ten month count > 3) 
     modFreq = do 10months
    else if(ten month count == 3) 
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     modFreq = “Few times yearly” 
    else                                             //ten month count < 3 
     modFreq = “Infrequent” 
  else 
   if( yearly count > 4) 
    modFreq = do 1year
   else if(yearly count == 4) 
    modFreq = “Few times yearly” 
   else                                                    //yearly count < 4 
    modFreq = “Infrequent” 
 Return modFreq 
Stop
1 year: Start 
 modFreq 
 yearly count = count pw changes within last 1 year 
  if (yearly count <10) 
   modFreq = “Few times yearly” 
                else                                                                                                          //more than 10 times in the past 1 year 
   ten month count = count pw changes within last 10 months 
   if (ten month count < yearly count) 
    modFreq = do 10months
   else 
    modFreq = “Recent activity” 
 Return modFreq 
Stop
10months: Start 
 modFreq 
 eight month count = count pw changes within last 8 months 
 Read ten month count 
  If (eight month count < ten month count) 
   modFreq = do 8months
  else 
   modFreq = “Recent activity” 
 Return modFreq 
Stop
8months: Start 
 modFreq 
 six month count = count pw changes within last 6 months 
 Read eight month count 
  If (six month count < eight month count) 
   modFreq = do 6months
  else 
   modFreq = “Recent activity” 
 Return modFreq 
Stop
6months: Start 
 modFreq 
 four month count = count pw changes within last 4 months 
 Read six month count 
  If (four month count < six month count) 
   modFreq = do 4months
  else 
   modFreq = “Recent activity” 
 Return modFreq 
Stop
4months: Start 
 modFreq 
 two month count = count pw changes within last 2 months 
 Read four month count 
  If (two month count < four month count) 
   modFreq = do 2months
  else 
   modFreq = “Recent activity” 
 Return modFreq 
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Stop
2months: Start 
 modFreq 
 monthly count = count pw changes within last 1 month 
 Read two month count 
  If (monthly count < two month count) 
   modFreq = do 1month
  else 
   modFreq = “Recent activity” 
 Return modFreq 
Stop
1month: Start 
 modFreq 
 Read monthly count 
  If (monthly count < 2) 
   modFreq = “Monthly” 
  else                                                                                                                               //more than once a month 
   two week count = count pw changes within last 14 days 
   if (two week count < monthly count) 
    modFreq = do 2weeks
   else 
    modFreq = “Recent activity” 
 Return modFreq 
Stop
Two weeks: Start 
 modFreq 
 Read two week count 
  If (two week count <2) 
  modFreq = “Every 2 weeks” 
  else                                                                                                                     //more than once every 2 weeks 
   weekly count = count pw changes within last 7 days  
   if (weekly count < two week count) 
    if (weekly count < 2) 
     modFreq = “Weekly” 
    else                                                                                                          //more than once a week 
     modFreq = “Excessively   
   else                                                                                    //weekly count is the same as two week count 
    modFreq = “Recent activity” 
 Return modFreq 
 Stop 
Table B.2 – Algorithm for Calculating Password Reuse
Algorithm
Start 
 pwReuse 
 Read employee data 
  Total pws = number of passwords in past 1 year 
  Reused_1_2 = number of passwords reused Once or Twice in past 1 year 
  Reused_3_5 = number of passwords reused 3, 4 or 5 times in past 1 year 
  Reused_6_9 = number of passwords reused 6, 7, 8 or 9 times in past 1 year 
  Reused_10up = number of passwords reused 10 times or more in past 1 year 
  pwReuse = total pws+_+reused_10up+_+reused_6_9+_+reused_3_5+_+reused_1_2 
 Return pwReuse 
Stop
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Table B.3 – Reused Algorithm for Calculating Password Strength
Algorithm
Start 
 Strength value 
 PW strength 
 Read password 
  If (there are lower class characters) 
   Strength value += 25 
  If (there are upper class characters) 
   Strength value +=25 
  If (there are digits) 
   Strength value +=25 
  If (there are symbols) 
   Strength value +=25 
 Read strength value 
  If (strength value == 100) 
   PW strength = “Strong” 
  If (strength value == 75) 
   PW strength = “Medium” 
  If (strength value == 50) 
   PW strength = “Weak” 
  If (strength value == 25) 
   PW strength = “Very weak” 
 Return PW strength 
Stop
Table B.4 – Algorithm for Calculating Data Backup Frequency
Algorithm
Start 
 buFreq 
 Read employee’s backup data 
  monthly count = number of backups during past 1 month 
  total bu = total number of backups since joining organization 
   if (total bu <= monthly count)                                                                         //Joined less than 1 month ago 
    buFreq = “Too new to determine” 
   else 
    if (monthly count < 4) 
     buFreq = “Infrequent” 
    else                                                                                              //more than 4 backups per month 
     weekly count = number of backups during the past 7 days 
     if (weekly count < 2) 
      buFreq = “Weekly” 
     else                                                                                                    //more than once a week 
      daily count = number of backups during the past 1 day 
      if (daily count < weekly count) 
       if (daily count < 2) 
        buFreq = “Daily” 
       else                                                                                     //more than once a day 
        buFreq = “Excessive” 
      else                                                                             //daily count is same as weekly count 
       buFreq = “Recent activity” 
 Return buFreq 
Stop
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Table B.5 – Algorithms for Calculating Unauthorized Data Access and Attempted Backing 
Up of Unauthorized Data
Algorithm
Data Access: Start 
 Accessing over clearance 
 Accessing without need to know 
 objClassification 
 empClearance 
 Read classification of selected data object 
  If (classification == “Public”) 
   objClassification = 5 
  else if (classification == “Unclassified”) 
   objClassification = 4 
  else if (classification == “Classified”) 
   objClassification = 3 
  else if (classification == “Secret”) 
   objClassification = 2 
  else                                                                                                                     //classification == “Top Secret” 
   objClassification = 1 
 Read selected project 
 Read employee’s project 
 Read employee’s clearance level 
  If (clearance == “Top Secret”) 
   empClearance = 1 
  else If (clearance == “Secret”) 
   empClearance = 2 
  else If (clearance == “Classified”) 
   empClearance = 3 
  else If (clearance == “Unclassified”) 
   empClearance = 4 
  else                                                                                                                                  //clearance == “Public” 
   empClearance = 5 
 Read employee’s current accessing over clearance 
 Read employee’s current accessing without need to know 
 if (empClearance <= objClassification)                                             //employee has same or higher clearance than the data 
  if (employee’s project == selected project)                                                          //employee has need to know
   Open file 
  Else                                                                                                   //same or higher clearance, but no need to know 
   Accessing without need to know = current accessing without need to know + 1 
   Not authorized to access file 
 Else                                                                                                                                                     //lower clearance 
  Accessing over clearance = current over clearance + 1 
  If (employee’s project == selected project)                                           //lower clearance but has need to know 
   Not authorized to access file 
  Else                                                                                                          //lower clearance and no need to know 
   Accessing without need to know = current accessing without need to know + 1 
   Not authorized to access file 
Stop
Data Backup: Start 
 Accessing over clearance 
 Accessing without need to know 
 Backup count 
 objClassification 
 empClearance 
 Read classification of selected data object 
  If (classification == “Public”) 
   objClassification = 5 
  else if (classification == “Unclassified”) 
   objClassification = 4 
  else if (classification == “Classified”) 
   objClassification = 3 
  else if (classification == “Secret”) 
   objClassification = 2 
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  else                                                                                                                     //classification == “Top Secret” 
   objClassification = 1 
 Read selected project 
 Read employee’s project 
 Read employee’s clearance level 
  If (clearance == “Top Secret”) 
   empClearance = 1 
  else If (clearance == “Secret”) 
   empClearance = 2 
  else If (clearance == “Classified”) 
   empClearance = 3 
  else If (clearance == “Unclassified”) 
   empClearance = 4 
  else                                                                                                                                  //clearance == “Public” 
   empClearance = 5 
 Read employee’s current accessing over clearance 
 Read employee’s current accessing without need to know 
 if (empClearance <= objClassification)                                             //employee has same or higher clearance than the data 
  if (employee’s project == selected project)                                                          //employee has need to know
   Backup count += 1 
   Backup file 
  Else                                                                                                   //same or higher clearance, but no need to know 
   Accessing without need to know = current accessing without need to know + 1 
   Not authorized to backup file 
 Else                                                                                                                                                     //lower clearance 
  Accessing over clearance = current over clearance + 1 
  If (employee’s project == selected project)                                           //lower clearance but has need to know 
   Not authorized to backup file 
  Else                                                                                                          //lower clearance and no need to know 
   Accessing without need to know = current accessing without need to know + 1 
   Not authorized to backup file 
Stop
liv
Table B.6 – Summarized Algorithm for Compiling Security Behavioural Profiles
Algorithm
Start 
 words 
 words_mgrView  
 words_secperView 
 words_bginfo  
 words_cyber 
 status 
 unauthorized access potential 
 improper sharing potential 
 motive 
 security status 
 introverted 
 extraverted 
 sensing 
 intuitive 
 thinking 
 feeling 
 judging 
 perceiving 
 IE 
 SN 
 TF 
 JP 
 personality type 
 behavioural profile 
 Read manager’s view 
 if( manager’s view contains “forget” or “Forget”) 
  if( manager’s view contains “not forget” or Not forget”)                                               //Does not forget keycards 
   if( words does not contain “Security conscious”) 
   Read security rule configuration for “Not Forgetting Keycards & PINs” (Security conscious, Information 
revealed easily, Understands and values ISM rules, Sociable, Ambitious, Has technical knowledge about computers, Easy 
hack target, Suspicious behaviour, May have social incentives, May have career-wise incentives, May have personal 
motives, May have financial motives, May have psychological motives and potential, Potential for improper sharing, 
Potential for unauthorized access, Minimum acceptable number) 
   ConfigureBhvRulesMgr 
    thinking++ 
  else                                    //Forgets keycards 
   if( words does not contain “Not security conscious”) 
   ConfigureBhvRulesMgr 
   improper sharing potential = true 
……
 behavioural profile = words appended to each other 
 if( behavioural profile contains “motive” or “incentive”) 
 motive = true 
 if( unauthorized access potential is true) 
 add “Has potential for unauthorized access” to status 
 if( improper sharing potential is true) 
 add “Has potential for improper information sharing” to status 
 if( motive is true) 
 add “Has motives/incentives” to status 
 security status = status appended to each other 
 if ( introverted > extraverted) 
 IE = “I” 
 else if( introverted < extraverted) 
 IE = “E” 
 Else 
 IE = “?” 
 if ( sensing > intuitive) 
 SN = “S” 
 else if( sensing < intuitive) 
 SN = “N” 
 Else 
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 SN = “?” 
 if ( thinking > feeling) 
 TF = “T” 
 else if( thinking < feeling) 
 TF = “F” 
 Else 
 TF = “?” 
 if ( judging > perceiving) 
 JP = “J” 
 else if( judging < perceiving) 
 JP = “P” 
 Else 
 JP = “?” 
 Personality type = IE + SN + TF + JP 
 if (personality type is “ISTJ” or “ISFJ” or “INFJ” or “INTJ” or “ISTP” or “ISFP” or “INFP” or “INTP” or “ESTP” or 
“ESFP” or “ENFP” or “ENTP” or “ESTJ” or “ESFJ” or “ENFJ” or ENTJ”) 
 write personality traits obtained from MBTI to each personality type 
 else 
 write “Cannot determine personality” 
Stop
ConfigureBhvRulesMgr: Start 
 if(item1 is not "-") 
                if(item1 is"Y" or item1 is"y") 
                    if(words does not contain "Security conscious") 
                            Security conscious++ 
                    if(words_mgrView does not contain "Security conscious") 
                         Security conscious++ 
                else if(item1 is"N" or item1 is "n") 
                    if(words does not contain "Not security conscious") 
                            Not security conscious++ 
                    if(words_mgrView does not contain "Not security conscious") 
                            Not security conscious++ 
……
Stop
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Table B.7 – Algorithm for Computing Security Training Schedules
Algorithm
Start 
 all schedules 
 segments 
 random schedule 
 workshop schedule 
 seminar schedule 
 inspection schedule 
 today’s date 
 Read current random schedule, current workshop schedule, current seminar schedule, current inspection schedule 
  if( current random schedule is after today’s date) 
   use current random schedule as random schedule 
  if( current workshop schedule is after today’s date) 
   use current workshop schedule as workshop schedule 
  if( current seminar schedule is after today’s date) 
   use current seminar schedule as seminar schedule 
  if( current inspection schedule is after today’s date) 
   use current inspection schedule as inspection schedule 
  if( all available schedules are in the past) 
   all schedules = do Compute training schedules
   split all schedules into segments 
   random schedule = segment[0] 
   workshop schedule = segment[1] 
   seminar schedule = segment[2] 
   inspection schedule = segment[3] 
 Update database with new training schedules 
 Colour selected date for random schedule green 
 if( workshop schedule is not “None”) 
  colour selected date for workshop schedule blue 
 if( seminar schedule is not “None”) 
  colour selected date for seminar schedule red 
 if( inspection schedule is not “None”) 
  colour selected date for inspection schedule yellow 
Stop
Compute training schedules:  Start
 random schedule 
 workshop schedule 
 seminar schedule 
 inspection schedule 
 schedules 
 today’s day 
 days to add 
  days to add = number of days from last Tuesday 
  random schedule = days to add + 28                                         //4 weeks from coming Tuesday 
  Read security status 
   if( security status contains “sharing”) 
    workshop schedule = days to add + 1 + 14                 //2 weeks from coming Wednesday 
   if( security status contains “unauthorized”) 
    seminar schedule = days to add + 1 + 7                                   //1 week from coming Wednesday 
   if( security status contains = “motive”) 
    inspection schedule = days to add + 2 + 14                                    //2 weeks from coming Thursday 
  schedules = random schedule + “_” + workshop schedule + “_” + seminar schedule + “_” + inspection schedule 
 Return schedules 
Stop
lvii 
Appendix C – Usability Evaluation Survey & Results 
Internal Control of Secure Information and Communication Practices through 
Detection of User Behavioural Patterns – Usability Evaluation: Group A (Tabular Data) 
Assuming you are the Information Security Officer of a business organization, please follow 
the instructions given below to compile security behavioural profiles and training schedules 
for as many employees as possible in order to answer the attached questionnaire. 
A. Given below is information gathered by the Security Behavioural Profiling System about 
employees’ cyber activities on 2013 September 30th. Please use this information to find
the behavioural patterns for the given employees. 
1. Password security behaviour – use the given “Password Changes” tables (tables 1­10) of 
the last twelve months until 2013 September 30th along with the “Employee” table (table 11) 
to find: 
i. Password Strength – strength of the current password (password with the latest date) 
ii. Password Modifying Frequency:
a) Infrequent
b) Few times a year 
c) Monthly
d) Every 2 weeks 
e) Weekly
f) Excessively 
g) Recent activity – if password modification occurred 
at a slower rate, but has suddenly picked up pace 
h) Too new to determine – if the employee joined the 
organization less than a month before 2013 
September 30th, this may be ignored 
iii. Password Reuse:
a) Ten times or over 
b) Six-to-nine times 
c) Three-to-five times 
d) One­to­two times – , this may be ignored since this is not 
considered a security infraction 
2. Data backup behaviour – use the given “Data Backup” tables (tables 12-21) of the last 
few months until 2013 September 30th along with the “Employee” table (table 11) to find: 
iv. Data Backup Frequency:
a) Infrequent
b) Weekly
c) Daily 
d) Excessive
e) Recent activity – if the password modification occurred at a 
slower rate, but has suddenly picked up pace 
f) Too new to determine – if the employee joined the 
organization less than a month before 2013 September 30th,
this may be ignored 
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3. Data access behaviour – use the given “Data Access” tables (tables 22-31) of the 
employees since their time of joining the organization until 2013 September 30th to find the 
number of attempts to access data without authorization: 
v. Over clearance level – if the classification level of the data object is higher than the 
clearance level of the employee according to the list below (where the highest level is 
denoted by 1 and the lowest level is denoted by 5): 
1) Top secret 
2) Secret
3) Classified 
4) Unclassified 
5) Public 
vi. Without Need-to-Know – if the project the employee is working on is different to the 
project the data object belongs to (employee’s project ID is different to the data 
object’s project ID) 
B. Use the partial results of employees’ cyber activities calculated above together with the 
background information of the employees (“Background Information” table – table 32) 
and the personal observations about their security behaviour inputted by their managers 
and security personnel (“Personal Views” table – table 33) given below, to compile the 
security behavioural profiles for these employees using the “Default Rules for 
Computing Security Behavioural Characteristics” table (table 34) below. In the “Default 
Rules for Computing Security Behavioural Characteristics” table, “N” depicts not having 
the corresponding characteristic, while “Y” depicts having that characteristic. The 
characteristics not relevant to a corresponding observable behaviour are coloured in grey. 
Thus, according to the default values, the security behavioural profile for an employee 
who leaves items unattended, for example, will contain the characteristics of not being 
security conscious, easily revealing information, not valuing or understanding ISM rules, 
and having a potential for improper sharing of information. The number column shows 
the maximum acceptable value before the relevant field is considered. Thus, if more than 
1 password is reused ‘three­to­five times’, or if any passwords are reused ‘six­to­nine’ 
times, or ‘ten times or over’, the security behavioural profile for that employee will 
contain the characteristics of not being security conscious, not valuing or understanding 
ISM rules, being an easy hack target, and having a potential for improper sharing of 
information. 
C. Use the security behavioural profiles compiled above to determine and schedule the 
security education and training to be given to these employees according to the 
following rules: 
Assuming there are no security trainings currently scheduled, 
For all employees  a random periodic risk perception renewal (automatic pop-up 
security awareness presentation followed by a Q&A session) scheduled in 4 weeks 
from the coming Tuesday 
For employees who have a potential for improper information sharing  a hands-on 
security workshop (conducted by external security professionals) scheduled in 2 
weeks from the coming Wednesday 
For employees who have a potential for unauthorized access to information  a 
security seminar (conducted by security managers and legal officials) scheduled in a 
week from the coming Wednesday 
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For employees who are deemed to have any kind of motive or incentive for engaging 
in improper information sharing or unauthorized access  closer inspection including 
background checks (by security managers and human resource managers) scheduled 
in 2 weeks from the coming Thursday 
For example, the training schedules computed on 30th September 2013 for an employee who 
requires all four types of security training will include: a random awareness training on 
Tuesday, 29th October 2013, a security workshop on Wednesday, 16th October 2013, a 
security seminar on Wednesday, 9th October 2013, and a security inspection on Thursday, 
17th October 2013.
Table 1 – Password Changes of Emp0001 
Table 2 – Password Changes of Emp0002 
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Table 3 – Password Changes of Emp0003 
Table 4 – Password Changes of Emp0004 
Table 5 – Password Changes of Emp0005 
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Table 6 – Password Changes of Emp0006 
Table 7 – Password Changes of Emp0007 
Table 8 – Password Changes of Emp0008 
Table 9 – Password Changes of Emp0009 
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Table 10 – Password Changes of Emp0010 
Table 11 – Employee 
Table 12 – Data Backup by Emp0001 
Table 13 – Data Backup by Emp0002 
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Table 14 – Data Backup by Emp0003 
Table 15 – Data Backup by Emp0004 
Table 16 – Data Backup by Emp0005 
Table 17 – Data Backup by Emp0006 
Table 18 – Data Backup by Emp0007 
Table 19 – Data Backup by Emp0008 
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Table 20 – Data Backup by Emp0009 Table 21 – Data Backup by Emp0010 
Table 22 – Data Access by Emp0001 
lxv
Table 23 – Data Access by Emp0002 
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Table 24 – Data Access by Emp0003 
Table 25 – Data Access by Emp0004 
Table 26 – Data Access by Emp0005 
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Table 27 – Data Access by Emp0006 
Table 28 – Data Access by Emp0007 
Table 29 – Data Access by Emp0008 
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Table 30 – Data Access by Emp0009 
Table 31 – Data Access by Emp0010 
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Table 32 – Background Information Table 33 – Personal Views 
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Table 34 – Default Rules for Computing Security Behavioural Characteristics 
Activity 
Personally Observed Non-Cyber Activities 
Forgets keys N - - - - - - - - - - - - Y - 
Does not forget keys Y - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Leaves items unattended N Y N - - - - - - - - - - Y - 
Does not leave items Y N - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Sociable - - - Y - - - - - - - - - - - 
Not sociable - - - N - - - - Y - - - - - - 
Ambitious - - - - Y - - - - Y - - - - Y 
Not ambitious - - - - N - - - - - - - - - - 
Writes down passwords N Y - - - - - - - - - - - Y - 
Does not write passwords Y - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Lends keys/PINs - Y - - - - - - Y - - - - Y - 
Does not lend keys/PINs - N - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Security conscious Y - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Not security conscious N - - - - - - - - - - - - Y - 
Understands/values ISM 
rules 
- - Y - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Does not understand 
/value ISM rules 
- - N - - - - - - - - - - Y - 
Background Information – Marital Status, Dependents, Academic Record, Financial Status, Criminal Record 
Married  - - - - - Y - 
Unmarried  Y - - - - - - 
Divorced  - - Y - - - - 
Widowed  - - - - - - - 
Dependents  Y  2 
BS/MS in Computers  Y  Y 
No BA/BS/MS  Y 
Low income  Y 
Has criminal record  Y  Y 
Cyber Activities – Password Strength 
Very weak - - - - - - Y - - - - - - - - 
Weak - - - - - - Y - - - - - - - - 
Medium  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Strong Y - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Cyber Activities – Password Modification Frequency 
Infrequent N - N - - - Y - - - - - - Y - 
Few times a year N - N - - - Y - - - - - - Y - 
Monthly - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Every 2 weeks - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Weekly - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Excessively - - - - - - - Y - - - - - - Y 
Recent activity - - - - - - - Y - - - - - - Y 
Cyber Activities – Password Reuse 
Ten times or over N - N - - - Y - - - - - - Y - 0 
Six-to-nine times N - N - - - Y - - - - - - Y - 0 
Three-to-five times N - N - - - Y - - - - - - Y - 1 
Cyber Activities – Attempts to Access Data without Authorization 
Over clearance - - N - - - - Y - - - - - - Y 0 
No need-to-know - - N - - - - Y - - - - - - Y 0 
Cyber Activities – Backup Frequency 
Infrequent N - N - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Weekly - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Daily - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Excessively - - - - Y - - Y - - - - - Y - 
Recent activity - - - - - - - Y - - - - - Y - 
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Internal Control of Secure Information and Communication Practices through 
Detection of User Behavioural Patterns – Usability Evaluation: Group B (Textual 
Results)
Assuming you are the Information Security Officer of a business organization, please follow 
the instructions given below to view security behavioural profiles and compute training 
schedules for as many employees as possible in order to answer the attached questionnaire. 
A.  Log in to the system using the following details: 
 User ID: iso0001 
 Password: osi00001 
Select task: View Security Behavioural Profiles and click “OK” 
View summarized profile: Select employee from drop-down list and click “Request 
Behavioural Profiles” 
View detailed profile: click “View Details” 
Request separate views: click “Separate Views” 
B. Use the security behavioural profiles viewed above to determine and schedule the 
security education and training to be given to these employees according to the 
following rules: 
Assuming there are no security trainings currently scheduled, 
For all employees  a random periodic risk perception renewal (automatic pop-up 
security awareness presentation followed by a Q&A session) scheduled in 4 weeks 
from the coming Tuesday 
For employees who have a potential for improper information sharing  a hands-on 
security workshop (conducted by external security professionals) scheduled in 2 
weeks from the coming Wednesday 
For employees who have a potential for unauthorized access to information  a 
security seminar (conducted by security managers and legal officials) scheduled in a 
week from the coming Wednesday 
For employees who are deemed to have any kind of motive or incentive for engaging 
in improper information sharing or unauthorized access  closer inspection including 
background checks (by security managers and human resource managers) scheduled 
in 2 weeks from the coming Thursday 
For example, the training schedules computed on 30th September 2013 for an employee who 
requires all four types of security training will include: a random awareness training on 
Tuesday, 29th October 2013, a security workshop on Wednesday, 16th October 2013, a 
security seminar on Wednesday, 9th October 2013, and a security inspection on Thursday, 
17th October 2013.
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Internal Control of Secure Information and Communication Practices through 
Detection of User Behavioural Patterns – Usability Evaluation: Group C (Graphical 
Results)
Assuming you are the Information Security Officer of a business organization, please follow 
the instructions given below to view security behavioural profiles and training schedules for 
as many employees as possible in order to answer the attached questionnaire. 
A. Log in to the system using the following details: 
 User ID: iso0001 
 Password: osi00001 
Select task: View Security Behavioural Profiles and click “OK” 
Select employee from drop-down list and click “Request Behavioural Profiles” 
View graphical profile: click “View Graphs” 
View training schedules: click “View Training Schedules” 
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Usability Evaluation Questionnaire
Nationality - ______________________________________________________________ 
Residing country - _________________________________________________________ 
Occupation - ______________________________________________________________ 
1 The speed with which you were able to 
arrive at decisions concerning the security 
behaviour of employees: 
Very fast Fast Moderate Slow Very 
slow
2 The speed with which you were able to 
schedule security training programmes for 
employees: 
Very fast Fast Moderate Slow Very 
slow
3 The amount of computations/calculations 
required to determine the security 
behaviour of the employees: 
Extensive Large Moderate Small Very 
small 
4 The amount of computations/calculations 
required to determine the security training 
schedules for the employees: 
Extensive Large Moderate Small Very 
small 
5 Additional tools/applications needed or 
preferred for arriving at conclusions:  
(e.g.: stationery/ database 
management system/ 
spreadsheet application/ 
computer program) 
6 Presentation of the (raw) data given: Very high High Moderate Poor Very 
poor
7 The extent/scope of detail gathered from 
the (raw) data presented to you: 
8 The usefulness of (raw) data presented to 
you in determining the potential for 
information security infractions by 
employees: 
Very high High Average Low Very 
low
9 Ease of determining the potential and/or 
motives of the employees for improper 
information sharing and/or unauthorized 
data access: 
Very easy Easy Not easy Difficult Very 
difficult 
10 Ease of recognizing any personal bias the 
managers or security personnel might have 
towards the employees: 
Very easy Easy Not easy Difficult Very 
difficult 
11 The overall usability of the system given to 
you:  
Very high High Average Low Very 
low
12 Additional Comments: 
Thank you. 
-Suchinthi Fernando (3rd Year Doctoral Student – Information Science & Control 
Engineering, Nagaoka University of Technology) 
